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The Chief Justice of the United States supervises a vast judicial bu-
reaucracy.  He is the titular head of the judicial branch:  1200 judges 
with life tenure, 850 magistrate and bankruptcy judges, and 30,000 
administrative staff members.  The careers he can affect most are 
those of his administrative employees.  Even the life-tenured judges, 
however, he can appoint to specialized judicial bodies.  In doing all 
this, he supervises the Federal Judicial Conference with a budget of 
$5.4 billion.1
If the Chief Justice of the United States does much, his counter-
part in Japan does much more.  Not only does the Japanese Chief Jus-
tice supervise administrative employees, he also supervises the judicial 
personnel office called the Secretariat.  In turn, the judges in the Se-
cretariat control the jobs of the 3000 other national judges who de-
cide cases.2  The American Chief Justice does not tell lower-court 
judges where to sit.3  Through the Secretariat, however, the Japanese 
Chief Justice does.  The American Chief Justice does not decide how 
much the lower-court judges earn.  Through the Secretariat, the Japa-
nese Chief Justice does.  Effectively, the Japanese Chief Justice exer-
cises power over the career of every lower-court judge.  All this he 
does as an appointee of a distinctly political Prime Minister. 
This is not an institutional structure likely to foster judicial inde-
pendence.  Nor, over the four decades during which the Liberal De-
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mocratic Party (LDP) was in power, did the Party care to foster inde-
pendence.  Instead, the Chief Justices supervised the courts in ways 
that furthered the electoral interests of the LDP.  Over time, litigants 
allied with opposition parties filed a variety of politically sensitive legal 
challenges.  When judges decided cases along the lines the opposition 
wanted, they tended to suffer in their career. 
The LDP temporarily lost power in 1993, and politicians from 
other parties took control.  Although the LDP reclaimed the govern-
ment in 1996, it had lost its electoral lock and now needed to consider 
the possibility that it might again find itself in the opposition.  
Throughout the ensuing instability, however, the courts retained their 
tightly controlled, conservative structure.  Smarter and harder-
working judges did better than the (relatively) dull and indolent.  
Those who served as loyal “organization men” did better than rene-
gades who had allied themselves with the Left. 
Both in Japan and in the United States, university professors and 
bar activists routinely express dismay at court systems so susceptible to 
control from the top.  Yet their dismay misses much of the point.  In 
Japan, these incentives place judges within a brutally competitive in-
ternal labor market.  Through the resulting incentives, the Chief Jus-
tice effectively imposes on the judges stringent, uniform standards.  
That uniformity, in turn, enables potential litigants to settle their dis-
putes out of court by using the expected litigated outcome as a guide 
to settlement. 
Through its “managed judges,” in other words, Japan maintains a 
system that lets people resolve their disputes by uniform and predict-
able legal standards.  The standards remain uniform and predictable 
because the judges who impose them have far more incentives than 
American judges to keep them that way.  That predictability, in turn, 
creates less need for lawyers to discover and argue the law and lets 
people in Japan use law and courts with far fewer lawyers than people 
in the United States.  Through these incentives, in short, Japan has 
slashed the transaction costs that American lawyers, juries, and judges 
magnify so remorselessly. 
The political costs to Japan of having “managed judges” are trivial.  
The vast majority of court cases involve no issues of political moment.  
Whether in Japan or in the United States, most legal disputes instead 
concern such things as traffic accidents and debt collection.  What is 
more, before 1993, the LDP was the majority party.  Thus, even in 
those rare political cases when judges furthered LDP electoral inter-
  
2006] THE CASE FOR MANAGED JUDGES 1881 
 
ests, usually the judges just gave Japanese voters what they wanted 
from their government. 
In this Article, we detail the structure of the Japanese courts and 
use statistical analysis to see if the promotion structure changed after 
the LDP lost power in 1993.  We start, in Part I.A, by laying out the in-
stitutional structure and explaining where political influence did or 
did not enter into the judiciary before 1993.  We then describe, in 
Part I.B, the events of 1993 and how they might have affected the be-
havior of the courts.  Next, in Part I.C, we look quantitatively at both 
the Supreme Court and the lower courts to see what actually hap-
pened after 1993.  We conclude, in Part II, with a summary and fuller 
discussion—necessarily more speculative than the rest of the paper—
of the advantages and disadvantages of the Japanese system of man-
aged judges. 
I.  STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A.  The Pre-1993 Tradition4
1.  Institutional Structure 
a.  The Secretariat 
At the apex of the Japanese judiciary stands the Chief Justice of 
the fifteen-member Supreme Court.  Appointed by the Prime Minis-
ter, he participates in judicial decision making.  He also presides over 
the Judicial Conference, which includes meetings of the justices of the 
Supreme Court on matters of rulemaking and judicial administration.  
And he runs the court’s administrative office, the Secretariat. 
 
4 We base this discussion on our earlier work, which began with a series of articles.  
See generally J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conserva-
tive in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001); J. Mark Ramseyer & 
Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 
(2001); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, Skewed Incentives:  Paying for Politics as a 
Japanese Judge, 83 JUDICATURE 190 (2000); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why 
the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (1999); J. Mark Ramseyer & 
Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime:  The Evidence from Japan, 13 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997).  We then compiled this material into a book:  J. MARK 
RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:  THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003) [hereinafter RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN]. 
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Table 1:  Appointments to the Supreme Court, 1973-2003: 
  Selected Statistics5
 
A.  Justices appointed   82 
 
B.  Chief Justices appointed   7  
 
C.  Mean age of appointment of Justices 
1973-1982 63.8 
1983-1992 64.3 
1993-1997 64.0 
1998-2002 64.0 
 
D.  Percent of Justices appointed from the lower courts 
1973-1982 42 
1983-1992 42 
1993-1997 29 
1998-2002 36 
 
E.  Percent of Justices appointed from the bar 
1973-1982 35 
1983-1992 31 
1993-1997 29 
1998-2002 29 
 
 
 
 
5
 ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN [OVERVIEW OF CAREERS OF ALL JAPANESE JUDGES] 
(Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai [Japan Democratic Lawyers’ Ass’n] ed., 4 ban [4th 
ed.] 2004). 
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Table 2:  Appointments to the Supreme Court, 1983-20056
 
Prime 
Minister Justice Born App. 
Apprx 
Age Prior Job 
Chief 
Justice 
Secre-
tariat 
Secretary-
General 
         
Nakasone Tsunoda 1920 1983 63 bureaucrat    
Nakasone Takashima 1919 1984 65 bureaucrat    
Nakasone Yaguchi 1920 1984 64 judge yes yes yes 
Nakasone Shimatani 1920 1984 64 lawyer    
Nakasone Nagashima 1918 1984 66 prosecutor    
Nakasone Oouchi 1922 1985 63 judge no yes yes 
Nakasone Fujishima 1924 1985 61 prosecutor    
Nakasone Kagawa 1921 1986 65 judge no no no 
Nakasone Sato 1920 1986 66 lawyer    
Nakasone Sakaue 1923 1986 63 lawyer    
Nakasone Hayashi 1923 1986 63 lawyer    
Nakasone Yotsuya 1922 1987 65 judge no yes yes 
Nakasone Okuno 1920 1987 67 lawyer    
Takeshita Teika 1923 1988 65 judge no no no 
Takeshita Oohori 1925 1988 63 prosecutor    
Kaifu Sonobe 1929 1989 60 judge no no no 
Kaifu Kusaba 1925 1989 64 judge yes yes yes 
Kaifu Mimura 1924 1990 66 bureaucrat    
Kaifu Nakajima 1925 1990 65 bureaucrat    
Kaifu Kabe 1927 1990 63 judge no yes yes 
Kaifu Hashimoto 1922 1990 68 lawyer    
Kaifu Sato 1924 1990 66 lawyer    
Kaifu Kizaki 1924 1990 66 lawyer    
Miyazawa Oonishi 1928 1991 63 judge no yes yes 
Miyazawa Ono 1930 1992 62 judge no yes no 
Miyazawa Miyoshi 1927 1992 65 judge yes yes no 
Miyazawa Oono 1927 1993 66 lawyer    
Miyazawa Ooshiro na 1993 na lawyer    
Hosokawa Chigusa 1932 1993 61 judge no yes yes 
Hosokawa Takahashi 1927 1994 67 bureaucrat    
Hosokawa Ozaki 1929 1994 65 lawyer    
Hosokawa Negishi 1928 1994 66 prosecutor    
Murayama Kawai 1932 1994 62 lawyer    
 
6  ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 5; Supreme Court of Japan, http:// 
courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/home.nsf/ehome?OpenPage.  The 2005 Court is in italics.  
Chief Justices are in boldface.  Koizumi’s first eight appointments (a Court majority) 
are between horizontal lines.  The last column indicates whether the justice had been 
secretary-general of the secretariat.   
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Table 2 (cont’d):  Appointments to the Supreme Court, 1983-2005 
 
Prime 
Minister Justice Born App. 
Apprx 
Age Prior Job 
Chief 
Justice 
Secre-
tariat 
Secretary-
General 
         
Murayama Fukuda 1935 1995 60 bureaucrat    
Murayama Fujii 1932 1995 63 judge no no no 
Murayama Endo 1930 1995 65 lawyer    
Murayama Ijima 1932 1995 63 prosecutor    
Murayama Fukuda 1935 1995 60 bureaucrat    
Hashimoto Oode 1932 1997 65 bureaucrat    
Hashimoto Kanatani 1935 1997 62 judge no yes yes 
Hashimoto 
Yamagu-
chi 1932 1997 65 judge yes yes yes 
Hashimoto 
Moto-
hara 1931 1997 66 lawyer    
Obuchi Kitagawa 1934 1998 64 judge no yes no 
Obuchi 
Kameya
ma 1934 1998 64 prosecutor    
Obuchi Kajitani 1935 1999 64 lawyer    
Obuchi Okuda 1932 1999 67 professor    
Obuchi Machida 1936 2000 64 judge yes yes no 
Mori Fukazawa 1934 2000 66 lawyer    
Koizumi Yokoo 1941 2001 60 bureaucrat    
Koizumi Hamada 1936 2001 65 lawyer    
Koizumi Ueda 1937 2002 65 judge no yes no 
Koizumi Shimada 1938 2002 64 judge no yes no 
Koizumi Izumi 1939 2002 63 judge no yes yes 
Koizumi Takii 1936 2002 66 lawyer    
Koizumi Fujita 1940 2002 62 professor    
Koizumi Kainaka 1940 2002 62 prosecutor    
Koizumi Tsuno 1938 2004 66 bureaucrat    
Koizumi Saiguchi 1938 2004 66 lawyer    
Koizumi Imai 1939 2004 65 judge  yes no 
Koizumi Nakagawa 1939 2005 66 lawyer    
Koizumi Horigome 1940 2005 65 judge  yes yes 
Koizumi Furuta 1942 2005 63 prosecutor    
  
 In administering the Secretariat, the Chief Justice runs an institu-
tion he knows well, especially compared to most of his fellow justices.  
From 1973 to 2003, a plurality of the eighty-two Supreme Court ap-
pointees had been career judges before joining the Court, but a ma-
jority had not.  During the same period, every Chief Justice had been 
a career lower-court judge.  Of the five Chief Justices appointed since 
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1983 (we lack career data on the earlier justices), each had worked in 
the Secretariat himself while a lower-court judge.  Three of the five 
had even headed it as the Secretary General.7  If we look beyond just 
the Chief Justice to all twenty post-1983 justices appointed from the 
lower courts, we find seven who had earlier served as Secretary Gen-
eral of the Secretariat, and another nine who had worked there in 
other capacities.  Only four had never worked in the Secretariat.8
Justices appointed from positions outside the court system would, 
of course, lack such experience and therefore have less power over 
the careers of lower-court judges.  These include university professors, 
prosecutors, lawyers in private practice, and twelve bureaucrats.  Of 
the last group, five had headed the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, five 
were former diplomats, one came from the ministry of Labor, and one 
from Health and Welfare.9
Like other Supreme Court justices, the Chief Justice serves until 
mandatory retirement at age seventy.10  In theory, voters can recall 
him and his Supreme Court colleagues at a general parliamentary 
election.  In practice, they do not, and have never even come close.11  
The justices’ jobs are secure. 
Not so the jobs of lower-court judges.  To Japanese judges, the Se-
cretariat represents what the Vatican is to ambitious Catholic priests:  
the ultimate locus of control over their careers.  Japanese judges join 
the court young.  Rather than being appointed in mid-career as in the 
United States, they join right after completing their legal training at 
the national law school, the Legal Research and Training Institute 
(LRTI).  Because for years the Institute entrance exam had a one to 
three percent pass rate (it is higher today), most judges flunked it sev-
eral times before starting the LRTI.12  As a result, by the time they 
joined the court, most were in their late twenties. 
  
7 See supra tables 1, 2. 
8 Here and elsewhere, we obtain our data on the Japanese judiciary from ZEN SAI-
BANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 5. 
9 John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary:  Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Pub-
lic Trust 9-10 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis School of Law, Faculty Working Papers Series, 
No. 05-10-01, 2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=821466. 
10 See Saibansho ho [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, § 50, translated in 2 EHS LAW 
BULL. SER. no. 2010 (2005) (“Justices of the Supreme Court shall retire upon the at-
tainment of seventy years of age . . . .”). 
11 See J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN’S POLITICAL 
MARKETPLACE 152-53 (rev. ed. 1997) (describing Japanese recall practice). 
12 See infra table 3, panel D. 
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Table 3:  Lower-Court Judges Appointed in  
1968, 1978, 1988, and 1998:  Selected Statistics13
 
A.  Number appointed 
 
Class of 1968 86 (93% male) 
Class of 1978  82 (93% male) 
Class of 1988 79 (91% male) 
Class of 1998 94 (81% male) 
 
B.  Percent University of Tokyo graduates 
 
Class of 1968 29.1 
Class of 1978 17.1 
Class of 1988 20.3 
Class of 1998 17.0 
 
C.  Percent University of Kyoto graduates  
 
Class of 1968 10.5 
Class of 1978 13.4 
Class of 1988 2.5 
Class of 1998 0.0 
 
D.  Mean times flunking the LRTI entrance exam  
 
Class of 1968 4.4 
Class of 1978 4.6 
Class of 1988 4.9 
Class of 1998 3.5 
 
E.  Percent appointed initially to the Tokyo District Court   
 
Class of 1968 18.8 
Class of 1978 19.2 
Class of 1988 31.5 
Class of 1998 30.1 
 
F.  Percent appointed initially to branch office or summary court   
 
Class of 1968 12.9 
Class of 1978   2.6 
Class of 1988 0.0 
Class of 1998 0.0 
 
G.  Percent members of the Young Jurists League  
 
Class of 1968 11.6 
Class of 1978 0.0  
Class of 1988          0.0  
Class of 1998   0.0  
 
 
Lower-court judges serve a series of ten-year terms.  Although the 
Secretariat can choose not to reappoint them at the end of each term, 
13 ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 5; OSORUBEKI SAIBAN [FEARSOME TRI-
ALS] (Shiso undo kenkyu sho ed., 1969); GAKUSHIKAI, KAIINSHI MEIROKU:  HEISEI 10 
NEN YO [MEMBERSHIP ROSTER:  FOR 1998 USE] (1997). 
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it almost invariably does.  Judges face mandatory retirement at age 
sixty-five, but most retire at about sixty.14
Judges sit where the Secretariat tells them to sit.  Ostensibly to 
train the young judges, to avoid corruption, and to equalize the qual-
ity of provincial courts, the Secretariat moves judges from post to post 
at regular intervals, typically of three years.  These moves can be, and 
often are, from one end of Japan to the other, and from trial courts to 
appellate courts and back again.  The Secretariat also decides lower-
court judges’ pay via promotions.  Although the Constitution does 
protect judges against pay cuts, it does not promise them pay raises.  
Judicial salaries range widely, and the Secretariat decides how fast a 
judge’s salary climbs the scale.15
The Supreme Court also differs from lower courts in how readily 
the heterodox can express their views.  By law, each Supreme Court 
justice must give his own opinion in a Supreme Court case.16  Hence, 
published cases include dissenting opinions as well as majority opin-
ions and dissenting votes.  In the lower courts, dissenting judges on a 
panel do not publish separate opinions.  They therefore cannot try to 
express their views and modify the law by the eloquent presentation of 
their arguments. 
b.  The Hierarchy of Posts 
Not all posts are created equal.  Usually, a judge wants a job in one 
of the major metropolitan areas, and in Tokyo if possible.  American 
visitors may delight in the mountain towns and seaside villages of the 
Japanese countryside, but ambitious Japanese professionals stick to 
Tokyo.  Tokyo houses the national government, as well as the Su-
preme Court and the Secretariat.  It represents the locus of the oppo-
sition parties and contains most of the professional, civic, and non-
profit organizations.  It houses the headquarters of most large 
corporations.  It is the site of the best universities.  And crucially for 
professionals with families, it has most of the best preparatory schools. 
Judges also want judgeships with administrative power.  After 
about twenty-two years, they can expect a “sokatsu” posting—a judge-
14 See RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 11, at 154 (discussing retirement prac-
tice); id. at 156, 165 (describing the circumstances of several non-reappointment inci-
dents). 
15 See id. at 155 (noting variation in the Japanese pay scale); RAMSEYER & RAS-
MUSEN, supra note 4, at 37-43 (detailing determinants of pay). 
16 Courts Act § 11. 
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ship with personnel responsibilities over their local court.17  Before re-
tiring, some can expect to serve as a District Court Chief Judge.  And 
the most successful will become Chief Judge of one of the seven High 
Courts (the appellate courts).18
Most judges covet certain nonjudicial jobs as well.  Perhaps the 
most prestigious such posting is to the Secretariat itself.  There, judges 
may handle personnel rotations, set court policy, or write rough drafts 
of Supreme Court opinions.  Other judges may work at a prosecutorial 
office.  They may teach future lawyers and judges at the LRTI.  Or 
they might spend a few years at the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Ministry 
of Justice. 
The same ambitious judges will shun the family courts, summary 
courts, and judicial branch offices when they can.  Branch offices tend 
to be in the smaller cities and have only one or a very few judges.  
Even promising judges will spend some time in a branch office, but 
fast-track judges will have fewer such rotations than others.  Summary 
courts (i.e., small claims courts) represent a separate structure en-
tirely, and most summary court judges are not part of the judicial hi-
erarchy at all.  Still, a standard judge on a slow track can occasionally 
find himself exiled to summary court duty for several years. 
Reflecting the prestige of Tokyo posts, the Secretariat every year 
chooses from its new recruits the most promising and names them to 
the Tokyo District Court (TDC).19  Typically, that appointment places 
such judges on a fast track.  Should they work shrewdly and prudently, 
they will earn more rotations through prestigious posts (and fewer in 
branch offices) than their colleagues for the rest of their career.  The 
Secretariat also determines which new judges are least promising, and 
until recently (a recent change in policy) named them to an initial 
appointment at a branch office or summary court.20
Take the career of a fairly successful judge, Keiichi Konagamitsu.  
A native of the southern provincial city of Fukuoka, Konagamitsu at-
tended the prestigious University of Kyoto, typically ranked second 
only to the University of Tokyo.21  He graduated from the LRTI in 
17 See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 4, at 40 tbl.2.5 (noting the mean number 
of years to sokatsu). 
18 See RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 11, at 166 tbl.9.2 (describing the high-
est career positions attained by a particular graduating class). 
19 See supra table 3, panel E. 
20 See supra table 3, panel F. 
21 See supra table 3, panels B & C (noting the higher percentage of Tokyo gradu-
ates with appointments than Kyoto graduates). 
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1965, and went to work at the district court in the urban center of 
Okayama.  Given that he was born in 1936, he probably graduated 
from the university in 1958.  Since he entered the LRTI in 1963, it 
would appear he failed the LRTI entrance exam five times.22
Konagamitsu’s first rotation after his three years in Okayama took 
him to the TDC.  Another three years there, and he went to provincial 
Niigata.  After yet another three years, he returned to Tokyo, and four 
years later (at age forty-two) moved to his home of Fukuoka.  Other 
than a few years teaching at the Tokyo-based LRTI, he spent most of 
the rest of his career in Fukuoka.  After serving as Chief Judge of the 
Fukuoka District Court for eighteen months, he retired in 2001 at age 
sixty-five. 
Over this elaborate hierarchy of judicial appointments presides 
the Chief Justice.  He supervises the Secretary General of the Secre-
tariat.  The Secretary General is himself on a fast track and may join 
the Supreme Court within a few years.  He supervises the judges staff-
ing the Secretariat, and those Secretariat judges monitor the perform-
ance of the rest.  They decide who will move where at the end of each 
three-year stint and how quickly to promote each judge on the pay 
scale. 
2.  Implementation23
During most of the post-war years, the Secretariat moved judges 
neither uniformly nor randomly.  Instead, it promoted the talented 
more quickly than the dull, and the industrious more quickly than the 
indolent (if we may use such terms comparatively—all who pass the 
LRTI examination form a relatively elite group).  Through a series of 
22 For a comparison of failure rates in other graduating classes, see supra table 3, 
panel D. 
23 The discussion in Parts II and III is based on RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 
4.  For two spirited responses to this empirical work, see generally John O. Haley, Book 
Review, 30 J. JAPANESE STUD. 235 (2004); Haley, supra note 9.  See also John O. Haley, 
Judicial Independence in Japan Revisited, 25 LAW JAPAN 1, 8-14 (1995) (discussing ju-
dicial independence among career judges in Japan).  Frank Upham’s summary and 
critique of the exchange appears in Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public 
Servants:  Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421 (2005). 
 As we understand Haley’s views, he does not contest our description of the institu-
tional framework, he does not dispute the way that the Secretariat has enforced it in 
the apolitical context, nor does he object to our characterization of the outcome of 
most politically sensitive cases as pro-LDP.  Instead, he challenges our use of principal-
agent theory to attribute that pro-LDP bias to LDP politicians.  He emphasizes the LDP 
politicians’ lack of overt intervention and the institutional freedom of the Supreme 
Court to control the lower courts as it wished. 
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empirical studies using multivariate regressions, we examined the gist 
of this system as it operated through the late 1980s.  Here is what we 
found. 
First, the Secretariat favored judges from the most selective uni-
versities.  Because these schools maintained the most selective en-
trance examinations, their graduates tended to be smarter and 
harder-working than others.  Not surprisingly, judges from these 
schools tended to obtain the best jobs at the outset, to obtain better 
posts over the course of their careers, and to climb the pay scale most 
rapidly.  Tokyo lawyers from elite schools also earn higher incomes 
than other Tokyo lawyers, as we find in related research. 
Second, the Secretariat favored the judges who passed the en-
trance examination to the LRTI most quickly.  Within the contempo-
rary bar, students who pass the exam on one of their first tries obtain 
the coveted jobs at the highest-paying law firms.  Lawyers who failed 
the exam fewer times also earn higher incomes than other lawyers, as 
we find in related research.  Within the courts, those who passed the 
exam early landed the best initial posts, obtained the more prestigious 
jobs over the next several decades and climbed the pay scale most 
quickly. 
Third, judges who did well early in their careers tended to do well 
later.  Even if we control for other measures of performance, those 
judges posted initially to the TDC continued to obtain better than av-
erage posts throughout their career.  They obtained pay raises more 
quickly as well. 
Fourth, although the evidence is more haphazard, the judges who 
published the most opinions tended to obtain better jobs.  And last, 
men seem to have climbed the pay scale more quickly than women.  
In related research, we also find that male lawyers earn higher in-
comes than women. 
3. Political Bias 
This institutional structure creates an obvious potential for politi-
cal bias.  The Prime Minister appoints the Chief Justice.  The Chief 
Justice supervises the Secretary General, the Secretary General runs 
the Secretariat, and the Secretariat decides which judges obtain the 
best jobs and quickest raises.  By appointing as Chief Justice men who 
shared his preferences, the Prime Minister could inject a political bias 
into the administration of the courts.  Given mandatory retirement of 
justices at age seventy, he might not have long to wait.  As Table 2 
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shows, Prime Minister Koizumi was able to appoint eight members of 
the Supreme Court, a majority, within two years of taking office. 
By basic principal-agent theory, whether the Prime Minister 
overtly intervened in the courts is beside the point.  The stereotypical 
English lord did not need to remind a good butler what he wanted 
done.  Good butlers knew what their masters wanted and did it before 
the master asked.  Indeed, the master only cared about results and was 
glad to delegate details to the butler.  To be sure, if a Prime Minister 
never intervened in the courts, that fact could indicate that he lacked 
the power to do so.  Yet in Japan, the institutional structure gave the 
Prime Minister full power to choose a Chief Justice who would impose 
the Prime Minister’s political preferences on the courts.  If he never 
intervened, that lack of intervention would more likely indicate that 
his appointees in the courts knew what he wanted done and did it 
without his needing to ask. 
Granted, before 1993 the Prime Minister’s power over the courts 
was indirect and slow.  His was the power to appoint, not the power to 
fire.  In turn, the Chief Justice’s power was the power to promote or 
withhold promotion, not the power to punish a wayward judge imme-
diately.  The LDP had long controlled the Parliament and expected to 
continue to control it.  Ultimately, indirect power was apparently 
enough:  overwhelmingly, the courts did promote the electoral inter-
ests of the LDP. 
The leaders of the LDP were not ideologues trying to leave a leg-
acy of social change and progressive legislation.  They were politicians 
who wanted to please voters and the business community, and a ma-
jority of voters and businesses wanted steady and continuing economic 
growth.  Toward that end, LDP leaders did not want courts that tried 
to change society.  If they wanted a new legal rule, as leaders of the 
majority party they could implement a change through a statute.  
They wanted courts that would administer the law efficiently and stay 
out of the way.  Staying out of the way included staying out of the way 
of government policies, of course, rather than introducing awkward 
questions of constitutionality. 
Thus, the LDP wanted two things of the judges:  to keep their po-
litical views out of their opinions and to refrain from invoking the 
Constitution when doing so would offend the LDP.  These considera-
tions suggest that Japanese courts may not always have been politically 
neutral on questions of constitutionality.  To test that neutrality before 
1993, we examined a series of politically charged disputes.  Again us-
ing multivariate regressions, we consistently found that those lower-
  
1892 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1879 
 
court judges who decided the cases in the way that LDP leaders 
wanted tended to obtain better jobs in the decade after the decision 
than those judges who flouted those preferences. 
We also examined the careers of the several hundred judges who, 
in the 1960s, joined the left-leaning Young Jurists League (YJL).24  
Judges who joined the League tended to suffer in their careers.  All 
else equal, they obtained less attractive positions than their peers.  
Concomitantly, they earned pay raises more slowly than those peers. 
B.  Potential Change 
1.  The Chaos of 1993 
The year 1993 was a bad one for the LDP.  After dominating poli-
tics for nearly four decades, the LDP entered the 1990s facing a mas-
sive range of problems.  Having championed enormously expensive 
public-works projects for years, in 1988 it had imposed a national sales 
tax that alienated a broad range of voters.  Under pressure from the 
United States, the LDP instituted trade and investment reforms that 
threatened key party constituents.  With the end of the Cold War, its 
broadly capitalist constituency began to unravel.  As rural Japanese 
continued to migrate to the cities, the LDP’s agricultural base steadily 
atrophied.  Bribery scandals discredited several of its key leaders.  And 
the economy—after booming for years—spiraled into recession. 
Within this crisis, old enemies within the party decided to settle 
scores.  Ichiro Ozawa, once a leading Prime Minister candidate, engi-
neered a no-confidence vote, quit the LDP, and created a new party 
around his faction.  In the ensuing election, every member in Ozawa’s 
faction won reelection, but the LDP captured only a minority of seats.  
Several non-LDP parties then regrouped.  They coalesced around 
Ozawa and renegade-LDP politician Morihiro Hosokawa and threw 
the LDP out of power.  Yet Hosokawa could not break free of Ozawa’s 
influence, and the coalition that had thrust him into power soon un-
raveled.  Hosokawa governed only eight months, and his successor 
(another ex-LDP politician) lasted barely two. 
Maneuvering through the chaos, the Socialists struck a deal with 
the LDP that catapulted their own leader, Tomiichi Murayama, into 
the Prime Minister’s office.  It was the Socialists’ first return to power 
since Tetsu Katayama’s short-lived Socialist government in 1947—a re-
24 We obtained the YJL roster from OSORUBEKI SAIBAN, supra note 13. 
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turn that did not last.  Like Hosokawa, Murayama suffered under be-
hind-the-scenes control by experienced LDP politicians.  He imple-
mented little if any of the traditional Socialist agenda, and his party 
lost its credibility.  In the 1996 election the LDP regained sole control 
of the government.  Usually in coalition with smaller parties, the LDP 
has held the Cabinet ever since.25
2. The Potential for Change 
Although the LDP eventually returned to power, it now faced a far 
more uncertain future.  In the days before 1993, LDP leaders had 
faced an opposition fractured into several parties—most of which lay 
far to the left of the median voter.  The LDP’s loss in 1993 was due to 
Ozawa’s defection, not to the power of the traditional opposition.  Af-
ter 1996, LDP leaders faced parties posing a much more serious elec-
toral threat and would not regain an absolute majority in Parliament 
until 2005.  In turn, this forced the LDP to share power with coalition 
partners, albeit partners small enough not to threaten their domi-
nance within the coalitions. 
We closed our previous studies of judicial incentives before the 
1993 crisis.  During its four decades in power, we concluded, the LDP 
had stacked the Supreme Court with men who shared its policy pref-
erences.  These men had supervised the Secretariat, and the Secre-
tariat had run a “tight ship.”  Under its control, the courts had oper-
ated as a smoothly running, hierarchically structured, and internally 
competitive organization.  Competing for a finite set of career rewards 
within this internal labor market, court employees (i.e., judges) had 
worked hard and worked well.  Largely, they had adjudicated disputes 
(a) predictably, (b) expeditiously, and (c) in politically sensitive cases, 
according to the policy preferences of the LDP. 
At the time we began our work on the Japanese courts, too few 
years had elapsed since 1993 for us to measure any change.  Now, 
however, the LDP has been back in power for nearly a decade.  How 
might the courts have changed?  From 1993 to 1994, a coalition 
dominated by former-LDP politicians ran the Cabinet, with but dubi-
ous hopes of long-term survival.  From 1994 to 1996, a bizarre coali-
tion of the biggest parties of the left and the right controlled the 
25 For a description of the events of 1993, see, for example, JACOB M. 
SCHLESINGER, SHADOW SHOGUNS: THE RISE AND FALL OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR POLITICAL 
MACHINE 264-73 (1997); Gary W Cox & Frances Rosenbluth, Anatomy of a Split: The Lib-
eral Democrats of Japan, 14 ELECTORAL STUD. 355, 355-67 (1995). 
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Cabinet.  Since 1996, the LDP has returned to power—but to an obvi-
ously fragile power. 
These vicissitudes potentially affected the courts along several di-
mensions.  First, where a capitalist party had ruled for decades, a self-
consciously leftist party now briefly shared that control.  All else held 
equal, we would expect more leftist personnel decisions.  If a liberal 
Prime Minister replaces a conservative Prime Minister, we would ex-
pect him to appoint more liberal justices to the Supreme Court.  Over 
time, we might expect the new justices to promote more liberal judges 
in the lower courts. 
Second, where one party had ruled before 1993, from 1993 to 
1996 coalitions ran the country.  The presence of coalition govern-
ments muddies the potential influence of ideology.  The Socialist Mu-
rayama may have wanted to shift the courts toward the left, but he 
shared power with the LDP and the LDP held no such preferences.  
Unfortunately for the empiricist, whether the government would now 
change the direction of the courts depended on the deals the politi-
cians cut, but politicians disclose few such deals. 
Finally, where the ruling party had expected to continue in power 
indefinitely before 1993, after 1993 no coalition or single-party gov-
ernment had such a high degree of confidence.  We next discuss why 
this matters. 
3.  The Importance of Expected Tenure 
a.  The Desire To Control 
The politicians running Japan since 1993 have lacked any assur-
ance that they can keep power indefinitely.  In turn, those fragile 
prospects have potentially affected both their desire to control the 
courts and their ability to do so.  Politicians stay in power by delivering 
portfolios of policies and programs wanted by at least a plurality of 
voters.  To do so, they need agents who will loyally design and imple-
ment the policies and programs those constituents demand.  Within 
the executive branch, they appoint bureaucrats to the job.  Within the 
judicial branch, they appoint judges. 
Politicians need judges who will loyally interpret and enforce the 
promised policies and programs.  Voters do not elect politicians to 
appoint judges who do no work.  Neither do they elect them to ap-
point judges who adjudicate cases without rhyme or reason, who take 
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bribes,26 or who sabotage the policies and programs for which the 
politicians were elected. 
To be sure, some voters also have a “taste” for independent courts, 
though they seem to want independent judges who do as they—the 
voters—want.  Yet independent judges can by definition do as they 
please.  They need not follow precedent.  They can invalidate pro-
grams they do not like.  They need not even work hard.  Even voters 
with a taste for an independent judiciary will not pay an unlimited 
price for it. 
Politicians and voters do benefit from independent judges, but 
they benefit primarily when their party is out of power.  When their ri-
vals control the government, they gain from institutions that block 
their rivals’ ability to deliver the agenda the majority of voters—but, 
alas, not their people—want.  Independent judges offer precisely that 
obstacle.  Indeed, by strategically interpreting statutes and constitu-
tions, they may even implement the policies and programs of the out-
of-power politicians.  Politicians who anticipate losing power will not 
necessarily keep courts independent.  Even they may decide that the 
immediate gains that result from stacking the courts in their party’s 
favor outweigh any future benefit from an independent judiciary that 
would protect them after they lost power.  But where a party with high 
odds of staying in office has less incentive to keep courts independent, 
at least a party facing low reelection probabilities might choose to insu-
late judges from political influence. 
According to a theory made famous by William Landes and Rich-
ard Posner, even majority politicians and voters might benefit from 
independent judges if they would otherwise be unable to keep their 
commitments.27  Suppose, for example, that voters want to encourage 
pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs.  To do so, judges 
need to commit to honoring the patents they award rather than in-
validating them after seeing the high prices the companies charge.  
Independent judges help overcome this temptation to renege.  If poli-
ticians care enough about the future, they thus may want to maintain 
the independence of those judges who remind them of their com-
26 By “judicial independence,” we refer to independence from the government, not 
independence from private parties in a case.  We know of no one who would justify 
judges who take bribes from private parties. 
27 See William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Inter-
est-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975) (asserting that independent courts 
at times “facilitate[] . . . the practice of interest-group politics” better than politicians). 
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mitments.  Through such independent judges, in short, they may pre-
serve a reputation that makes their commitments valuable. 
b.  The Ability To Control 
A party’s ability to stay in power will also affect its ability to control 
the courts.  A party that anticipates staying in power can afford to ap-
point sixty-four-year-old justices when the retirement age is seventy.  
Because such justices face only six years in office, they will not signifi-
cantly “grow in office” and change their political preferences.  Be-
cause the party will still be in office when they retire, it will be able to 
replace them with other “sound” appointees. 
Less obviously, a party with long-term prospects will also be better 
able to control the lower courts.  Rational lower-court judges will 
know that the party will probably stay in office for the foreseeable fu-
ture.  As a result, they will not expect the political criteria for promo-
tion to change over time.  They will not reason that a boldly anti-LDP 
decision will, after an unhappy but short exile to the provincial prefec-
ture of Tottori, earn them a High Court seat when the Left comes to 
power.  Not only will judges working under a party with long-term 
prospects more readily conform, heterodox jurists will tend to self-
select out of judicial careers.  If they share the political preferences of 
the opposition, they will instead opt for careers in politics, at universi-
ties, or in private practice. 
4.  Observable Implications 
What, then, might be the observable implications of the crisis of 
1993?  Might Hosokawa and Murayama have tried to shift the courts 
to the left?  Might they and the LDP Prime Ministers who followed 
them have tried to weaken the ability of sitting cabinets to control the 
courts?  If they tried either approach, we would expect to observe the 
following: 
a.  Younger Supreme Court Justices 
Because the pre-1993 LDP could expect to stay in power, it ap-
pointed justices close enough to retirement not to change their poli-
tics while on the bench.  If post-1993 politicians decided to extend 
their influence into the future, they would have appointed younger 
justices. 
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b.  More Justices from the Universities and the Bar 
During the long years of LDP control, conservatives and the apo-
litical disproportionately self-selected into the bureaucracy and the 
courts.  Those with tastes to the left instead opted for careers in the 
bar, in business, in politics, and in the universities.  As a result, non-
LDP prime ministers who wanted to control the courts would dispro-
portionately have named justices from outside the bureaucracy and 
the courts. 
c.  Changed Career Patterns Within the Lower Courts 
Before 1993, the Secretariat ran the courts tightly and used that 
control to favor judges who implemented LDP preferences in sensitive 
cases.  If post-1993 politicians hoped to use their control over the ju-
diciary to implement different policies, they should have promoted 
different judges.  If they hoped instead to reduce a ruling party’s abil-
ity to manage the courts, they should have weakened Secretariat con-
trol more generally.  In either case, the courts should exhibit large-
scale deviations from earlier career patterns. 
C.  Judicial Administration Since 1993 
We divide the period after 1993 into two parts:  the interregnum 
of weak coalition governments from 1993 to 1996 and the LDP cabi-
nets from 1996 to the present.  We also divide the courts into two 
parts:  the Supreme Court, subject to quick turnover after 1993 be-
cause of the proximity of all the justices to retirement, and the lower 
courts, where judges continued on their slow path to advancement 
under the supervision of the Secretariat.  The direct impact of any 
changes would show up in the Supreme Court.  The indirect impact 
would show up in the lower courts, either at once (out of anticipation 
of weaker control by a less pro-LDP Chief Justice in the future) or 
more slowly (once a new Chief Justice began supervising the Secre-
tariat). 
1.  Supreme Court Appointees 
a.  Age 
Because they expect to lose power periodically, political parties in 
the United States name relatively young justices to the Supreme 
Court.  So too did the Socialist Katayama in Japan in the 1940s.  As 
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Prime Minister when the new constitution took effect in 1947, Kata-
yama had the chance to appoint all fifteen Supreme Court justices.  
Just as one might expect from an American president, he appointed a 
majority of justices under age sixty. 
By contrast, before 1993, the LDP could expect to stay in power 
indefinitely and had little reason to appoint justices who were young.  
LDP leaders could afford to appoint the best-qualified candidates, re-
gardless of age.  Indeed, older candidates presented a distinct advan-
tage.  Younger justices can change over time and eventually enforce 
political preferences quite different from those of the party that ap-
pointed them.  Rather than risk ideological drift, the LDP coupled 
mandatory retirement (at age seventy) with older appointees—
generally about age sixty-four.28
After 1993, prime ministers continued to appoint Supreme Court 
justices at about age sixty-four.  Nominally independent Hosokawa 
appointed his four justices at an average age of 64.8.  At-least-
nominally-Socialist Murayama appointed his five at a mean of 62.6.  
Since returning to power, the LDP has kept the appointment age 
largely unchanged.29
b.  Careers 
If by virtue of its unbroken power the LDP had shaped the courts 
in its image, men like Hosokawa and Murayama might have made a 
break from the past and picked their justices from sources other than 
the courts that the LDP had controlled for so many years.  Table 1 su-
perficially suggests such a break from the past.  Earlier LDP prime 
ministers had appointed over forty percent of their justices from the 
judiciary.  Hosokawa and Murayama each chose only one of their jus-
tices from the courts, and—significantly—the man Murayama picked, 
Masao Fujii, had been a member of the leftist YJL in the 1960s.30
28 See supra table 1. 
29 See supra table 2. 
30 That YJL members have tended to suffer in their careers does not mean they all 
suffered.  Fujii enjoyed a stellar career long before Murayama named him to the Su-
preme Court.  Fujii joined the courts in 1957 at age twenty-four.  By the time of the YJL 
controversy in 1969, he was already in his second teaching stint at the LRTI.  From 
there, he would go to the Osaka District Court, the Osaka High Court, the Ministry of 
Justice Civil Affairs Bureau, the Tokyo District Court, and the Tokyo High Court.  In 
fact, he became Chief Judge of the Osaka High Court (probably the third most prestig-
ious post in the lower courts after the Secretary General of the Secretariat and the 
Chief Judge of the Tokyo High Court) three months before Murayama took office.  
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Curiously, however, Hosokawa and Murayama did not turn to the 
obvious sources for the rest of the justices.  They could have found 
plenty of independents and Socialists in the bar and the universities.  
Yet Hosokawa picked only one of his four justices from the bar, and 
Murayama picked only two.  Neither chose a law professor.  Instead, 
Hosokawa picked one justice from the Ministry of Justice (a prosecu-
tor) and one from the Ministry of Labor, and Murayama picked one 
from the Ministry of Justice (another prosecutor) and one from the 
diplomatic corps.31
The appearance of a break with the past is deceptive.  Neither Ho-
sokawa nor Murayama controlled the Cabinet long, and neither con-
trolled it without coalition partners.  Rather than try hard to reshape 
the courts, they apparently retained the LDP practice of “reserving” 
each Supreme Court seat for a particular “line.”  Under this practice, 
LDP prime ministers had replaced justices from the lower courts with 
lower-court judges, former prosecutors with prosecutors, former law-
yers with lawyers, and others with, well, “others.” 
Appointed from the Fukuoka High Court in 1973, Justice Eriguchi 
illustrates one of the “judge” lines.  When Justice Eriguchi retired in 
1980, the Prime Minister replaced him with Justice Terada of the To-
kyo High Court.  Terada retired in 1985, and the Prime Minister re-
placed him with Justice Oouchi, again from the Tokyo High Court.  In 
1992, Justice Oouchi was replaced by Justice Miyoshi (Tokyo High 
Court), and he in turn by Justice Kanaya (Tokyo High Court) in 1997. 
By contrast, Justice Amano, appointed in 1971, had been a Osaka 
prosecutor.  Within two days of Amano’s retirement in 1978, the 
Prime Minister named Justice Yokoi of the Nagoya prosecutor’s office.  
Yokoi retired in 1984, and was replaced by Justice Nagashima of the 
same office.  Four years later, he was succeeded by Justice Teika.  Be-
cause Justice Teika had been a lower-court judge, the Amano-Yokoi-
Nagashima line now became a judicial line.  When Prime Minister 
Takeshita appointed the next justice three months later, however, he 
named a man from the Tokyo prosecutor’s office.  The LDP main-
tained similar lines for lawyers and “others” for such assorted figures 
Note, however, that Fujii—unlike some YJL members—did promptly resign his mem-
bership in the organization when the controversy erupted in 1969. 
31 Obviously, the LDP would have exercised at least as much control over the ex-
ecutive branch as over the courts.  Japan has a civil service system, but, as with the 
judges, tasks must be assigned and promotions granted, and the elected official at the 
top of the ministry will choose civil service heads who have done a good job of manag-
ing their subordinates. 
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as professors, diplomats, and bureaucrats.  Hosokawa and Murayama 
adhered to the custom too, apparently deciding that judicial reform 
was not a high priority for their coalition governments. 
2.  The Lower Courts 
To see what happened in the lower courts, we combine the meth-
odology of our earlier studies with new data on the post-1993 era.  In 
these earlier studies, we examined three categories of variables that 
determined judicial careers:  rulings in individual cases that might in-
terest the LDP, membership in a left-wing political organization, the 
YJL, and nonpolitical variables such as quality of college degree and 
the number of times a judge failed the LRTI entrance examination.32  
In this study, we focus on the last two categories.33
a.  Appointees 
Since 1993, the Secretariat has continued to appoint annually 
about the same number of new judges it appointed earlier.  Over the 
years, that number has fluctuated between roughly 70 and 110.  The 
ninety-four new judges of 1998 fit into that range comfortably.34  Al-
though the 1998 judges on average did pass the LRTI exam more 
quickly than their predecessors, this change just reflects a slight shift 
in the score necessary to pass the exam and not necessarily any change 
in the quality of the test-takers.  Where the pass rate had stayed below 
2% from 1974 to 1984, by 1996 (the year the Class of 1998 entered the 
LRTI) it had risen to 2.9%.35
The Secretariat did appoint more women in 1998 than in the past.  
Where in earlier years it had taken one woman for every nine men, by 
32 We estimate this from the age at which a judge entered the LRTI. 
33 As noted earlier, we take the data on judicial careers from ZEN SAIBANKAN 
KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 5, the data on YJL membership from OSORUBEKI SAIBAN, 
supra note 13, and university affiliation for the class of 1998 from GAKUSHIKAI, KAIIN-
SHI MEIROKU:  HEISEI 10 NEN YO, supra note 13. 
 For the regressions below, we augmented the data by adding seventeen judges 
from the classes of 1957 and 1959 to the class of 1958 and twenty-four judges from the 
classes of 1966 and 1967 to the class of 1968, to increase the number of YJL members 
in the sample.  This is an example of “stratified sampling,” a technique commonly used 
in statistics to increase the information content of the data. 
34 See supra table 3, panel A. 
35 Ministry of Justice Secretariat Personnel Section, Shiho shiken dai niji shiken shutsu-
gansha su, gokakushasuto no suii [Trends in the Number of Applicants and Passers on the 
Secondary Legal Exam], http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/051007-1/17syutu-gou2.html (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
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1998 it accepted one woman for every four.  Rather than any shift in 
Secretariat policy, however, the change probably reflects the larger 
number of women pursuing legal careers (by 2004, 23.5% of the LRTI 
class were women).36
b.  Initial Postings 
For many years, the Secretariat has identified its most promising 
recruits and named them to the TDC.  In 1968, 33% of the University 
of Tokyo graduates and 55% of the University of Kyoto graduates 
started at the TDC, but only 7% of the graduates of other universities 
did.  In 1978 the Secretariat named 31% of the Tokyo and 27% of the 
Kyoto graduates to the court, but only 15% of the rest. 
At the same time, the Secretariat sent its least promising young 
judges to the branch offices and summary courts.  In 1968 and 1978, 
only 1.5% of Tokyo and Kyoto graduates started in a branch office or 
summary court; 9.1% of the graduates of other colleges did.  Only 
2.4% of the judges who flunked the LRTI exam four or fewer times 
started at such courts; 23.3% of the rest did.  By 1988, the Secretariat 
had abandoned its policy of starting any judges at branch offices, per-
haps having decided that the weaker judges had all the more need to 
learn their trade from numerous and able senior colleagues. 
The simplest way to compare career paths before and after 1993 is 
to look one-by-one at the various characteristics of LRTI graduates 
and see how a given characteristic relates to success.  That is what 
Panel A of Table 4 does.  The “pre-1993” column looks at the first as-
signments of judges from the classes of 1958, 1968, 1978, and 1988.  
The “post-1993” column looks at the first assignments of judges from 
the class of 1998.  The first row tells us that 30% of the University of 
Tokyo graduates started at the TDC before 1993, but 63% did thereaf-
ter.  The second row tells us that after 1993 more non-University of 
Tokyo graduates started at the TDC too, but that the increase was 
smaller.  Apparently, when the Secretariat decided to increase the 
number of judges it started at the TDC, it looked primarily to its To-
kyo alumni for the additional appointees. 
 
36 Ministry of Justice Secretariat Personnel Section, Heisei 17 nendo shiho shiken dai 
niji shiken ronbunshiki shiken no kekka ni tsuite [Regarding the Results of the Secondary 
Essay Legal Exam, 2005], http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/051007-1/17ron-soukatu.html 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
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Table 4:  Initial Appointment to the Tokyo District Court37
 
 
A.  Fraction of Class Starting at Tokyo District Court   Pre-1993          Post-1993 
                                                                                                   
U Tokyo graduates .30 .63 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates   .16   .23 
 
U Kyoto graduates                                                                                                 .23                            † 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates   .18 
 
Flunks < 5 .24 .35 
   Flunks > 4   .10   .19 
 
Men .20 .32 
   Women   .09   .24 
 
 
B.  Determinants of Starting at the Tokyo District Court 
 
U Tokyo .117** Cl-98 • U Tokyo .288 
 (1.91)  (1.54) 
 
U Kyoto .022  
 (0.31) 
 
Flunks -.034*** Cl-98 • Flunks -.035  
 (3.17)       (1.48) 
 
Male -.019 Cl-98 • Male  .226* 
 (0.23)   (1.73)  
 
N 424 
Adjusted R2 .04 
 
 
 
Judges who flunked the LRTI exam fewer times also had a greater 
chance of starting at the TDC (24% if they flunked four or fewer 
times; 10% if they flunked more than four times), but after 1993 more 
judges started in Tokyo whether they had flunked the test seldom or 
often.  A greater fraction of men than women started at the TDC, and 
here too the fraction of both increased over time. 
 
37 See supra table 3.   
 The pre-1993 column details the first postings of the classes of 1958, 1968, 1978, 
and 1988; the post-1993 column details the first postings of the class of 1998.  Depend-
ent variable = 1 if initial appointment is to the Tokyo District Court.  The regression is 
probit.  The table gives the marginal effects calculated at the median, followed by the 
absolute value of the z-statistic.  The adjusted R  is calculated for the analogous regres-
sion in OLS.  Even for the classes of 1958 and 68, YJL membership did not affect initial 
appointments. 
2
† No U Kyoto graduates were in the class of 1998   
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level  
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Looking thus at probabilities characteristic-by-characteristic is a 
good way to start, but it has two deficiencies.  First, it is hard to know 
quite what to make of a given cluster of four numbers—male versus 
female and pre-1993 versus post-1993.  When the percentage of both 
male and female judges starting in Tokyo rises, for example, what are 
we to make of any change in the effect of being male?  Formal statisti-
cal tests exist to answer that question, but they cannot address the sec-
ond deficiency:  when different characteristics are correlated with 
each other, independent comparisons cannot tell us which is the true 
cause of starting in Tokyo.  If University of Tokyo graduates also are 
less likely to have failed the LRTI exam many times, for example, both 
characteristics may seem to result in a higher chance of being posted 
to the TDC, even if only one is truly causal.38
The regression method used in Panel B of Table 4 solves these 
problems.  Statistical regressions separate the effects of correlated po-
tential causes and generate measures of the reliability of the different 
effects.  Table 4 uses a probit regression, the kind appropriate when 
the dependent variable that we are trying to predict (in this case, 
whether the Secretariat first posts a judge to the TDC) can only take 
two values—here 1 if he starts at the TDC and 0 otherwise.  We take as 
our data set information on all judges hired in 1958, 1968, 1978, 1988, 
and 1998.  We then explore the impact on this posting of a judge’s 
university affiliation (two variables equal to 1 if a judge attended ei-
ther of the top two universities), the number of times he failed the 
LRTI entrance examination (Flunks), and his or her sex (Female = 0; 
Male = 1). 
To explore whether the class starting in 1998 differs significantly 
from the other classes, we interact these variables with (i.e., multiply 
these variables by) a dummy variable (Cl-98) equal to 1 if a judge is a 
member of the 1998 class and 0 otherwise.  Thus, for a judge from the 
class of 1968 whose value of Flunks was 6, his value of Cl-98•Flunks 
would be 0 (0 x 6 = 0).  The non-interacted variables give us the im-
pact of the variable on an initial TDC posting for the population as a 
38 For our database as a whole, University of Tokyo graduates flunked the LRTI a mean 
of 3.21 times, University of Kyoto graduates flunked it a mean of 2.95 times, and the other 
judges flunked it a mean of 4.51 times.  In other research, we calculate similar figures for 
practicing lawyers.  In a random sample of 804 lawyers, we find that they failed the exam a 
mean 6.6 times.  University of Tokyo graduates (169 lawyers) flunked 5.2 times, and Univer-
sity of Kyoto graduates (72 lawyers) 5.2 times.  See Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric 
B. Rasmusen, The Industrial Organization of the Japanese Bar (Mar. 7, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/jpnbar.nakazato.ramseyer.rasmusen.pdf. 
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whole.  The interacted variables tell us whether the Secretariat treated 
the 1998 class differently from the others. 
The positive number of .117 on University of Tokyo affiliation in-
dicates that judges who attended Tokyo were more likely than the 
others to start at the TDC.  The z-statistic of 1.91 indicates that the co-
efficient is greater than zero at nearly the 5% significance level, giving 
us a moderate level of assurance that the effect did not result from co-
incidence.  The marginal effect of .117 indicates that a Tokyo gradu-
ate is about 12% more likely than others to obtain this posting. 
Similarly, the marginal effect of -.03 on Flunks indicates that each 
year a judge flunks the LRTI exam reduces his or her chances of start-
ing at the TDC by 3%.  This effect is highly significant, at better than 
the 1% significance level.  The coefficients on sex and University of 
Kyoto affiliation, however, are not significant.  Thus, the smaller per-
centage of women relative to men starting at the TDC that we saw in 
Panel A is not big enough, given the small starting number of female 
judges, for us to conclude that sex actually mattered to initial ap-
pointment. 
The interaction variables indicate that the Secretariat continues to 
favor Tokyo graduates and those who pass the LRTI exam quickly.  
The coefficient on the interacted Tokyo variable is positive, and that 
on the interacted Flunk variable is negative—but the z-statistics are 
1.48 (for Flunks) and 1.73 (for males).  Those z-statistics are too low 
for us to conclude that the Secretariat favored such judges more 
strongly than before, but neither does it seem that they favored them 
less strongly. 
Note that the coefficient on the interacted sex variable is positive 
and significant at the 10% level:  the data do not tell us whether the 
Secretariat favored men earlier (when there were few women), but by 
1998 (when women made up 19% of the group) it significantly raised 
its preference for men over women.  This illustrates the value of the 
regression technique.  Panel A of Table 4 indicates that the percent-
age of women starting in the TDC rose from 9% pre-1993 to 24% post-
1993, a much bigger increase than for men.  The regression, however, 
tells us that it is only after 1993 that we can reliably conclude that the 
Secretariat gave men a better initial posting than women. 
Apparently, the Secretariat did not greatly change the way it allo-
cated its initial appointments after 1993.  The number of women did 
increase enough for us to conclude that the Secretariat appointed 
women less often to the TDC.  Obviously, however, this does not show 
any decreased conservatism. 
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c.  Methodological Observations 
We will apply the method just described—first look at averages, 
characteristic by characteristic, then at regressions—to various stages 
of a judge’s career.  In each case we will use regressions with inter-
acted variables to compare the impact of different characteristics be-
fore and after 1993.  For the first appointment in a judge’s career, the 
post-1993 sample was the class of 1998.  For judges 5-15 years out, it 
will be the class of 1988; for those 15-25 years out, the class of 1978; 
and for those 25-35 years out, the class of 1968. 
Two variables we will use in the remainder of the regressions do 
not appear in Table 4.  Leftist judges created a massive controversy in 
1969 when a conservative group published the YJL membership ros-
ter.  Because they had stayed out of the public eye until then, YJL 
membership did not affect the starting posts of the class of 1968.  Be-
cause of the controversy that ensued, judges of later classes did not 
join the League.39  For these reasons, we exclude YJL membership in 
Table 4.  Because no members of the 1998 class attended the Univer-
sity of Kyoto (we do not know why the courts recruit fewer judges 
from the University of Kyoto than in the past), we also excluded an in-
teracted Kyoto variable. 
In the regressions to follow, we will use the “tobit” technique in-
stead of “probit.”  Probit is appropriate when the dependent variable 
(TDC) can take only two values.  Tobit is appropriate when the de-
pendent variable (the percentage of a decade in a particular kind of 
post) cannot be less than zero or greater than one hundred. 
d.  Early Intermediate Career (Years 5-15) Postings 
i.  Administrative Jobs 
After starting its top recruits at the TDC, the Secretariat continues 
to favor them through the early intermediate years (years 5-15) of 
their careers.  Take its decisions about whom to name to prestigious 
administrative posts.40  Both before and after 1993, judges who started 
in the TDC, who were graduates of the University of Tokyo, and who 
39 So we have been told.  As our YJL roster dates from 1969, it obviously would not 
list any judges who joined after that date. 
40 See infra table 5, panel A.  Administrative posts include appointment as an in-
structor at the LRTI, at the Secretariat, or at the Ministry of Justice.  A judge with “so-
katsu” responsibilities is not included, on the ground that such a judge will still be 
spending most of his time judging cases. 
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were male spent more years in the prestigious administrative posts.  
Most dramatically, those who started at the TDC spent 28% of their 
decade 5-15 in administrative posts, compared to a mere 6% for other 
judges. 
 Panel C of Table 5 uses regression analysis to explore which vari-
ables are truly significant determinants of administrative postings and 
whether their importance changed over time.  The dependent vari-
able is thus the fraction of the decade covering the fifth to fifteenth 
years of a judge’s career that a judge spent in administrative posts.  As 
independent variables, we include the variables in Table 4, along with 
a dummy equal to 1 if the judge had been a member of the YJL in 
1969 and a dummy equal to 1 if the judge started his career at the 
TDC. 
Because judges in the class of 1988 were at years 5-15 during 1993-
2003, we also interact all variables with class of 1988 affiliation.  As in 
Table 4, these interacted variables let us test formally whether the Se-
cretariat treated judges at this career stage differently during 1993-
2003 than it had treated preceding “generations.”  Because no mem-
ber of the class of 1988 joined the YJL, we omit the interacted term of 
that variable. 
During the three decades from 1973 to 2003, the Secretariat sig-
nificantly favored its TDC starters over their colleagues.  The marginal 
effect of .19 indicates that such judges spent nearly two extra years of 
the decade with administrative responsibilities.  The effect is statisti-
cally significant at better than the 1% level. 
The Secretariat also favored men at this early intermediate stage 
of their career.  This effect is significant at the 1% level.  The impact 
of YJL membership is not statistically significant, consistent with YJL 
members spending 9% of the decade and nonmembers 10% of the 
decade in administrative posts.41  University affiliation and Flunks are 
also not statistically significant.  This is less surprising than it might 
seem, because these variables do increase the chance of starting at the 
TDC.42  Given the impact of the initial TDC appointment, Flunks and 
university affiliation obviously do indirectly affect the 5-15 decade per-
formance. 
 
 
 
41 See infra table 5, panels A & C. 
42 See supra table 4. 
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Table 5:  Years 5-15 Appointments43
 
A.  Fraction of Years 5-15 in Administrative Posts Pre-1993          Post-1993
                              
TDC Starters .28 .30 
   Non-TDC Starters    .06    .08 
 
U Tokyo graduates .16 .20 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates    .08    .14 
 
U Kyoto graduates                                                                                                 .15                         † 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates    .10 
 
Flunks < 5 .12 .23 
   Flunks > 4    .06    .06 
 
Non-YJL Members .10 ‡ 
   YJL Members    .09 
 
Men .11 .16 
   Women    .03    .10 
 
 
B.  Fraction of Years 5-15 in Branch Offices or Summary Courts  Pre-1993          Post-1993
  
TDC Starters .15 .19 
   Non-TDC Starters    .35    .28 
 
U Tokyo graduates .24 .29 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates    .33    .24 
 
U Kyoto graduates .27 † 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates    .31  
 
Flunks < 5 .27 .19 
   Flunks > 4    .39    .31 
 
Non-YJL Members .30 ‡ 
   YJL Members    .35 
 
Men .32 .25 
   Women    .19    .20 
 
 
43 See supra table 3.   
 The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1968 during 1973-1983 and 
the class of 1978 during 1983-1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of the 
class of 1988 during 1993-2003.   The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time 
during years 5-15 of a judge’s career that he spends in an administrative post (Panel C) 
or branch offices or summary courts (Panel D).  The regression is tobit.  Panel C:  Cen-
soring:  (179,58,2).  Panel D:  Censoring:  (59,177,3).  The table gives the marginal ef-
fects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of the z-statistic.  The ad-
justed R2 is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS. No members of the class of 
1988 were members of the YJL. 
† Only one graduate.   
‡ No YJL members were in this age bracket   
* Significant at the 10% level  
** Significant at the 5% level  
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 5 (cont’d):  Years 5-15 Appointments 
 
C.  Determinants of Administrative Appointments 
 
YJL -.026  
 (1.51) 
U Tokyo  .035  Cl-88 • U Tokyo  .009  
 (1.21)  (0.22) 
U Kyoto -.007  Cl-88 • U Kyoto  .622** 
 (0.27)  (2.07) 
Flunks -.005  Cl-88 • Flunks -.012  
 (1.44)  (1.68) 
Male  .046*** Cl-88 • Male  .083  
   (2.70)  (1.23) 
TDC Starters  .191***  Cl-88 • TDC Starters -.005  
 (3.49)  (0.14) 
 
n 239 
Adjusted R2 .26 
 
 
D.  Determinants of Branch Office Appointments 
 
YJL  .101* 
 (2.02) 
U Tokyo -.048  Cl-88 • U Tokyo  .118  
 (1.13)  (1.39) 
U Kyoto -.001  Cl-88 • U Kyoto -.331*** 
 (0.02)  (13.17) 
Flunks  .024***  Cl-88 • Flunks .003  
 (5.51)  (0.35) 
Male  .142***  Cl-88 • Male -.106*  
 (2.77)  (1.83) 
TDC Starters -.165***  Cl-88 • TDC Starters  .084 
 (4.21)  (1.03) 
 
n 239 
Adjusted R2 .26 
 
 
The interaction variables again indicate that little has changed 
since 1993.  The Secretariat now significantly favors Kyoto graduates 
more than it did before.  The most interesting change is that failing 
the LRTI exam fewer times, a characteristic of little direct importance 
to this part of a judge’s career before 1993, does have a noticeable, if 
small, effect afterwards.  A judge who flunked the LRTI exam one 
more time than the median judge now spends 1.2% less of the decade 
in an administrative post.  The low significance levels on the other in-
teracted variables show that the Secretariat has otherwise simply con-
tinued its practices from the past. 
ii.  Branch Offices 
Panel B suggests that many of the same variables affect the frac-
tion of the decade a judge spends in branch offices or summary courts 
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(albeit in the opposite direction).  Before 1993, judges who started at 
the TDC, who graduated from either the University of Tokyo or the 
University of Kyoto, who failed the LRTI exam fewer times, and who 
avoided the YJL spent less time in these undesirable posts.  Curiously, 
the Panel also indicates that women spent less time there than men.  
Other than the favoritism toward elite college students, it suggests that 
these phenomena continued after 1993. 
Because simple summary statistics are only suggestive, however, let 
us turn to the regression results in Panel D.  This Panel shows the re-
sult of a regression of the percentage of the 5-15 decade spent in 
branch offices or summary courts.  For these jobs, YJL membership is 
significant–-on average a YJL member spent one more year than other 
judges in a branch office during this period (the median judge in the 
classes of 1958, 1968, or 1978 spent three years in branch offices dur-
ing the 5-15 decade).  Having flunked the LRTI exam more times is a 
highly significant predictor of branch office posting, and a first post-
ing in TDC is a significant negative predictor.  The effect of the uni-
versity variables, however, is insignificant.  Interestingly enough, men 
did indeed spend more time in branch offices than women (14.2% 
more). 
The interaction variables show two changes after 1993.  First, 
Kyoto graduates effectively did not go to branch offices (recall that 
they also took administrative jobs more often).44  Second, the effect of 
being male disappeared.  The marginal effect of -.106 for class of 1988 
males effectively neutralizes the marginal effect of .142 for males gen-
erally.  Otherwise, the Secretariat largely continued its earlier prac-
tices. 
e.  Later Intermediate Career (Years 15-25) Postings 
i.  Administrative Jobs 
In this phase of his career a judge will usually spend much more 
time in administrative posts than before.  Panel A of Table 6 shows 
that pre-1993 judges who started in the TDC spent a full 61% of the 
decade between their fifteenth and twenty-fifth years in administrative 
posts.  Even for the non-TDC judges, the figure was as high as 32%.  
The averages in Panel A show few changes from before 1993 to after, 
except that women seem to do much worse after 1993. 
44 See supra table 5, panel D. 
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The regression results, however, show that nothing changed after 
1993:  even the treatment of women remained unchanged.45  Other 
things held equal, women spent less time in administrative posts be-
fore 1993 (two years less of the decade), and that phenomenon did 
not thereafter change.  Attending the Universities of Tokyo or Kyoto 
and starting one’s career in the TDC helped one’s career, and being a 
member of the YJL significantly hurt it—but both effects held true be-
fore and after 1993.  For this phase of a judge’s career, nothing 
changed after 1993:  every one of the interaction variables is statisti-
cally insignificant. 
ii.  Branch Offices 
Oddly enough, being a YJL member seems not to have affected 
whether a judge spent time in a branch office during his later inter-
mediate career.  What did matter was (as with obtaining administra-
tive jobs) whether he graduated from the Universities of Tokyo or 
Kyoto and spent his first years at the TDC.46  Where a non-YJL judge 
spent 18% of the decade in branch offices, the YJL member spent only 
3% more.  But where Tokyo graduates spent 11%, the others spent 
twice as much time there.  Where the Kyoto graduates spent 7%, the 
others spent three times as much.  Those who started at the TDC 
spent 8% of the decade in branch offices, while the rest spent 21%.  
And those who failed the LRTI exam fewer times spent fewer years in 
branch offices. 
The regressions in Table 6, Panel D, confirm the insignificance of 
YJL membership on branch office postings at this stage of a judge’s 
career.  They also confirm both that elite university graduates spent 
less time in branch offices before 1993, and that the Secretariat did 
not significantly change that policy thereafter.  They indicate that the 
Secretariat favored TDC starters both before and after 1993, that any 
preference for low-Flunk judges appeared significant only after 1993, 
and that the effect of sex was insignificant.47
45 See supra table 5, panel C. 
46 See infra table 6, panel B. 
47 See infra table 6, panel D. 
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Table 6:  Years 15-25 Appointments48
 
A.  Fraction of Years 15-25 in Administrative Posts Pre-1993                Post-1993
  
TDC Starters .61 .62 
   Non-TDC Starters    .32    .27 
 
U Tokyo graduates .44 .34 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates    .33    .32 
 
U Kyoto graduates .56 .55 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates    .32    .29 
 
Flunks < 5 .40 .37 
   Flunks > 4   .26    .21 
 
Non-YJL Members .38 † 
   YJL Members    .30 
 
Men .37 .34 
   Women    .31    .08 
 
B.  Fraction of Years 15-25 in Branch Offices or Summary Courts Pre-1993                Post-1993
  
TDC Starters .08 .04 
   Non-TDC Starters    .21    .27 
 
U Tokyo graduates .11 .19 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates    .22    .22 
 
U Kyoto graduates .07 .14 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates    .21    .23 
 
Flunks < 5 .16 .16 
   Flunks > 4    .27    .36 
 
Non-YJL Members .18 † 
   YJL Members    .21 
 
Men .19 .20 
   Women    .15    .44 
 
 
 
48 See supra table 3.   
 The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1958 during 1973-1983 and 
the class of 1968 during 1983-1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of the 
class of 1978 during 1993-2003.  The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time 
during years 15-25 of a judge’s career that he spends in an administrative position 
(Panel C) or branch office or summary courts (Panel D).  The regression is tobit.  
Panel C:  Censoring:  (68,143,7).  Panel D:  Censoring:  (116,100,2).  The table gives 
the marginal effects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of the  
z-statistic.  The adjusted R2 is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS.    No 
members of the class of 1978 were members of the YJL. 
† No YJL members were in this age bracket 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 6 (cont’d):  Years 15-25 Appointments 
 
C.  Determinants of Administrative Appointments
 
YJL -.114** 
 (2.58) 
U Tokyo .119*  Cl-78 • U Tokyo  -.072  
 (1.87)  (0.73) 
U Kyoto .237***  Cl-78 • U Kyoto  -.032  
 (3.14)  (0.27) 
Flunks -.003  Cl-78 • Flunks  -.031  
 (0.39)  (1.57) 
Male .197***  Cl-78 • Male .055  
 (3.25)  (0.52) 
TDC Starter .210***  Cl-78 • TDC Starter .057  
 (2.84)  (0.46) 
 
n 218 
Adjusted R2 .21 
 
D.  Determinants of Branch Office Appointments 
 
YJL .056  
 (1.07) 
U Tokyo -.097***  Cl-78 • U Tokyo .065  
 (2.14)  (0.52) 
U Kyoto -.145***  Cl-78 • U Kyoto .173 
 (3.24)  (1.00) 
Flunks .011  Cl-78 • Flunks .028*  
 (1.53)  (1.73) 
Male .015  Cl-78 • Male -.091  
 (0.21)  (1.36) 
TDC Starter -.110**  Cl-78 • TDC Starter -.139*  
 (2.16)  (1.84) 
 
n 218 
Adjusted R2 .13 
 
 
f.  Late Career (Years 25-35) Postings 
i.  Administrative Jobs 
The last phase of a judge’s career is especially interesting for us 
because the years after 1993 include the class of 1968, the last class to 
contain YJL members.  Judges in later classes have not yet reached this 
stage of their careers.  As a result, we here compare the class of 1958’s 
late career (from 1983 to 1993) with the class of 1968’s (from 1993 to 
2003). 
The summary statistics in Panel A of Table 7 suggest that before 
1993, most of our judge characteristics did not affect administrative 
appointments.  Judges who started in the TDC did no better than 
those who did not.  In this context at least, the effect of a good start 
seems finally to have worn off.  The effect of youthful indiscretion has 
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not:  YJL membership continues to show a substantial impact on ad-
ministrative appointments.  Those who joined the group decades ear-
lier were still spending 19% less time in administrative jobs.49
 The penalty on YJL membership continues post-1993, and the 
other variables start showing an effect too.  At least by the simple aver-
ages of Panel A, after 1993 judges who started at the TDC did better 
than those who did not; University of Tokyo and University of Kyoto 
graduates did better than the others; and those who passed the LRTI 
exam quickly did better than those who failed repeatedly.  Has the 
Crisis of 1993 at last produced a change in judicial careers for those 
judges senior enough to be in positions of power? 
The regression results say no.  In fact, very little has changed.50  
YJL membership continues to have a negative effect.  The effect is sig-
nificant, subtracting 1.75 years from a judge’s time in administrative 
jobs.  Crucially, the small and insignificant marginal effect of .028 for 
the interaction variable shows that the adverse effect of YJL member-
ship persists after 1993.  Neither the brief stint under a Socialist Prime 
Minister nor the LDP’s loss of its long-term lock on power helped 
judges who had shown their left-wing leanings 25 years before.  We 
cannot say whether this was because of their actual membership or 
because of the beliefs that induced them to become members.  What-
ever the reason, however, the once-actively-leftist judges were doing 
worse than other judges in their late careers. 
The other variables show little effect on administrative postings.  
Although men seem to have done much better than women before 
1993, the absence of more than two women in the 1958 class makes 
the calculated coefficient unreliable.  All other calculated effects are 
insignificant before 1993.  Only being a Kyoto graduate had a signifi-
cant effect afterwards. 
49 See infra table 7, panel A. 
50 See infra table 7, panel C. 
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Table 7:  Years 25-35 Appointments51
 
 
A.  Fraction of Years 25-35 in Administrative Posts Pre-1993 Post-1993
  
TDC Starters .63 .79 
   Non-TDC Starters    .63    .49 
 
U Tokyo graduates .60 .61 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates    .65    .55 
 
U Kyoto graduates .60 .85 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates    .65    .53 
 
Flunks < 5 .65 .63 
   Flunks > 4    .58    .37 
 
Non-YJL Members .69 .60 
   YJL Members    .50    .48 
 
Men † .57 
   Women     .48 
 
 
B.  Fraction of Years 25-35 in Branch Offices or Summary Courts  Pre-1993 Post-1993
  
TDC Starters .08 .02 
   Non-TDC Starters    .06    .19 
 
U Tokyo graduates .05 .09 
   Non-U Tokyo graduates    .06    .17 
 
U Kyoto graduates .07 .04 
   Non-U Kyoto graduates    .06    .16 
 
Flunks < 5 .06 .14 
   Flunks > 4    .04    .16 
 
Non-YJL Members .04 .12 
   YJL Members    .10    .20 
 
Men † .14 
   Women     .19 
 
 
 
51 See supra table 3.   
 The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1958 during 1983-1993; the 
post-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1968 during 1993-2003.  The de-
pendent variable gives the fraction of the time during years 25-35 of a judge’s career 
that he spends in an administrative post (Panel C) or branch office or summary courts 
(Panel D).  The regression is tobit.  Panel C:  Censoring: (17,84,33).  Panel D:  Censor-
ing: (98,35,1).  The table gives the marginal effects calculated at the median, followed 
by the absolute value of the z-statistic.  The adjusted R2 is calculated for the analogous 
regression in OLS. 
† Only two women were in this age bracket  
* Significant at the 10% level  
** Significant at the 5% level  
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 7 (cont’d):  Years 25-35 Appointments 
 
C.  Determinants of Administrative Appointments 
 
YJL -.175* Cl-68 • YJL .028  
 (1.78)  (0.22) 
U Tokyo -.086  Cl-68 • U Tokyo .104  
 (0.62)  (0.69) 
U Kyoto -.124  Cl-68 • U Kyoto .283** 
 (1.11)  (2.21) 
Flunks -.027  Cl-68 • Flunks -.012  
 (1.16)   (0.47) 
Male  .298**  Cl-68 • Male -.153 
 (2.10)  (1.20) 
TDC Starter -.028  Cl-68 • TDC Starter .178  
 (0.15)  (1.05) 
 
n 134 
Adjusted R2 .14 
 
 
 
D.  Determinants of Branch Office Appointments 
 
YJL .102  Cl-68 • YJL -.000  
 (0.86)  (0.00) 
U Tokyo -.064  Cl-68 • U Tokyo -.017  
 (0.61)  (0.11) 
U Kyoto -.001  Cl-68 • U Kyoto -.088  
 (0.01)  (0.69) 
Flunks -.001 Cl-68 • Flunks .002  
 (0.07)  (0.07) 
Male -.296  Cl-68 • Male .141  
 (1.37)  (1.50) 
TDC Starter .092  Cl-68 • TDC Starter -.170**  
 (0.44)  (1.96) 
  
n 134 
Adjusted R2 .10 
 
 
ii.  Branch Offices 
Time spent in branch offices in a judge’s late career tells a similar 
story, with two differences.52  First, although none of our judge char-
acteristics predicts branch office time significantly before 1993, after 
1993 a TDC start does.  Having begun one’s career at the TDC does 
reduce the amount of time a judge spends in branch offices 25 years 
later.  Apparently, the “good start” effect persists here, even if not with 
administrative jobs.  Second, YJL is as unimportant as the other vari-
 
52 See supra table 7, panels B & D. 
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ables in predicting branch office time.  YJL membership seems to have 
reduced the rewards to a judge, but not increased the penalties. 
g.  Summary 
A bewildering number of regressions, perhaps, but the analysis 
does let us explore whether anything happened during the 1990s to 
the various phases of a Japanese judge’s career.  Several conclusions 
emerge.  First, merit—at least as measured by the quality of a judge’s 
college, his or her first assignment, or the number of times he or she 
failed the LRTI exam—has not diminished in importance.  In some 
contexts, such as branch office assignments in mid to late career, 
meritocratic variables may have become even more important than 
they were before 1993. 
Second, men now do better than women.  Paradoxically, however, 
that phenomenon may just reflect the fact that too few women joined 
the courts before the 1990s to measure the effect of sex reliably.  
Third, the adverse effects of YJL membership continued even into the 
1990s, long after the events of 1968.  Whether because of the contin-
ued stigma of membership or, more likely, because youthful member-
ship can signal leftwing sympathies that last a lifetime, YJL judges suf-
fered lagging careers even thirty years later. 
Although the LDP lost its dominance in 1993, that loss did not re-
duce the career pressures, political or meritocratic, on lower-court 
judges.  Instead, the Secretariat continued to administer the courts 
much as it had done before.  What was an earthquake in electoral 
politics left the judges with much the same incentives they had earlier. 
II.  THE CASE FOR MANAGED JUDGES 
What should we make of all this?  Does the Japanese Constitution 
need a drastic overhaul?  Did it (and we Americans drafted it, after 
all) create this mess?  Or is it even a mess? 
A.  The Constraints 
1.  Japan 
The Japanese Constitution did not generate this system.  The 
Constitutions of Japan and the United States do not treat the courts 
very differently.  Under both, Supreme Court justices are appointed 
by the executive branch.  They cannot be removed except by im-
peachment or, in Japan, through popular vote or upon reaching re-
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tirement age.  Lower-court judges in Japan serve ten-year terms but, as 
previously noted, the government almost always renews their terms.  
The government can neither cut their pay, nor discipline them except 
for gross misconduct.  The court system is formally independent and 
the Supreme Court has the last word on the law.  All this is essentially 
the same in both countries. 
What differs is the internal structure of each country’s courts, 
which neither country’s Constitution dictates.  According to the Japa-
nese constitution’s text, Japanese politicians could reorganize the 
courts by statute and insulate them from even indirect political con-
trol.  According to the American Constitution’s text, American politi-
cians could reorganize the federal courts and rein in judges who op-
posed their wishes. 
Let us begin with Japan.  The only constitutional constraint on in-
ternal court structure appears in Article 80: 
[ J]udges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a 
list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court.  All such judges shall 
hold office for a term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment, 
provided that they shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as 
fixed by law.
53
Article 80 does not mandate the system Japan has now.  Granted, 
it does require the Cabinet to obtain the consent of the existing Su-
preme Court for its lower-court nominees, instead of the consent of 
the upper house, as in the United States.  Yet giving the court that 
veto increases the power of the courts rather than reduces it.  The rest 
of Article 80 does not cut the power and independence of the judici-
ary.  If the Japanese parliament wanted to give judges life tenure, it 
could change the statutory retirement age from 65 to 120.  If it wanted 
to end three-year rotations, it could mandate appointment to specific 
courts in specific regions.  These are matters of statutory and adminis-
trative, not constitutional, practice. 
2. The United States 
Perhaps more surprisingly, the U.S. Constitution’s text does not 
prevent the United States from having a system like Japan’s.  The 
Constitution does not mandate federal circuits.  By statute, Congress 
could abolish federal circuits and empower the Chief Justice to decide 
the location and court at which each federal judge would work.  It 
53 KENPŌ [Constitution] art. 80, para. 1. 
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could allow the Chief Justice to run a personnel office that would pre-
liminarily make that decision.  And it could permit him to staff that 
office with the judges he finds brightest and most trustworthy, serving 
there at his pleasure.  As in Japan, he could then transfer judges 
whose rulings displeased him to places the judges did not want to live. 
Even under the existing statutory framework, a president with a 
loyal Chief Justice could use postings to punish a disagreeable judge.  
Suppose the President appointed prominent University of Chicago 
Professor I. Jones to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in down-
town Chicago, conveniently near his home.  Four years later, suppose 
Jones started enjoining the successor President’s legislation.  The new 
President could not fire Jones or cut his pay.54  Neither could he dis-
regard Jones’s injunctions (though he could appeal them).  But if the 
Chief Justice agreed, the President could find an overworked court 
that needed more judges.  Applying 28 U.S.C. § 291, the President 
could then order Jones to show up “temporarily” for work in such 
courts.  Pinch-hitting Jones might have to move from Omaha to Tal-
lahassee to Anchorage and back again. 
If the President (like the LDP) controlled the legislative branch, 
he could go further.  Suppose he wanted to punish not just Jones but 
the entire Seventh Circuit.  He could merge it into the adjoining 
Eighth (by amending 28 U.S.C. § 48).  He could then require the Chi-
cago judges to rotate through St. Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, and St. 
Paul. 
Does all this sound implausible?  In fact, many of the statutes are 
already in place.  About half of the judges sitting in United States fed-
eral district courts are in a special class of judges created by the Fed-
eral Magistrate’s Act of 1968; they are appointed by other judges,  
serve eight-year terms, and can be fired for poor performance.55  Even 
Article III judges can find themselves reprimanded, certified as dis-
abled, or stripped of their cases—all by the judicial administrative or-
ganization called the circuit judicial council.56
54 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
55 See Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 661, 663 (2005) (describing the creation of magistrate judges). 
56 Administrative Office Act, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (1939) (creating 
circuit judicial councils); Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2) 
(Supp. 2002) (“Action by the judicial council under paragraph (1)(C) may include . . . 
ordering that, on a temporary basis for a time certain, no further cases be assigned to 
the judge[,] . . . censuring or reprimanding such judge[,] . . . certifying disability of the 
judge[, or] . . . requesting that the judge voluntarily retire . . . .”).  A judge certified as 
disabled can be replaced as if he had died and descends into an uncertain status “jun-
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Reprimands, however, seem to be uncommon, even if misbehavior 
does occur.  Professor Geyh reports: 
Instances of judicial misconduct included judges who appointed relatives 
as court officers or who heard cases litigated by relatives; judges who im-
properly refused to disqualify themselves; judges who were suspected of 
corruption; judges who billed the government for questionable ex-
penses; and judges who were accused of being excessively aggressive in 
moving cases on their dockets.  Instances of judicial inaction included 
both judges who delayed decision-making and judges who took extended 
vacations.
57
The leading case is Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit.58   
Judge Chandler’s “docket was backlogged, he had been named as a 
defendant in civil and criminal cases, and he had been issued writs of 
mandamus twice for failing to disqualify himself from hearing cases 
where he had an alleged bias toward one of the parties.”59  The Judi-
cial Council ordered that he be given no new cases and his existing 
ones be taken away from him.  He filed a motion with the Supreme 
Court, but the Court ducked the issue of constitutionality and rejected 
the motion on procedural grounds.  Even here, however, the judge’s 
punishment was merely embarrassing publicity and a reduction in his 
workload.  American judges do not have significant power over other 
Article III judges, but that is a matter of statute and custom, not the 
Constitution. 
The basis for the Japanese approach thus does not lie in the con-
stitutional text.  It lies in statute, and in the competitive internal labor 
market that statutes create.  Given the electoral markets in which 
Japanese legislators must compete to survive, it lies in the preferences 
voters hold. 
ior in commission to the other judges of the circuit.”  28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (2000).  Be-
tween six and thirteen judges—poor records are kept—had been certified as disabled 
as of 1993.  Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 243, 275 (1993).
57 Geyh, supra note 56, at 263-64 (footnotes omitted).  Geyh describes a sample of 
complaints and their results, as do Professors Barr and Willging.  Jeffrey N. Barr & 
Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence 
Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 49-51 
(1993). 
58 398 U.S. 74 (1970). 
59 Geyh, supra note 56, at 269. 
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B.  The Alternating Parties Theory of Judicial Independence 
If the texts of the constitutions do not dictate the different judicial 
systems, why then do the Japanese and U.S. courts operate so differ-
ently?  Put differently, why do Japanese and U.S. voters choose such 
different court systems?  In an earlier work we proposed an alternat-
ing parties theory of judicial independence.60  Consider an incumbent 
political party that must decide whether to “manage” its judges or 
keep them “independent.”  Ignore, for the present, considerations of 
efficiency in everyday law.61  Look instead at politically charged cases 
like election law and reapportionment disappointments. 
In these politically charged cases, suppose the incumbent party 
prefers managed judges.  We represent this preference in Table 8 with 
a payoff of ten from managed judges and eight from independent and 
unbiased ones.  The opposition party prefers the independent and 
unbiased judges, which we represent by a payoff of six compared to 
zero for managed judges.  The particular numbers merely indicate the 
ordering of preferences rather than size, except for the following cru-
cial point:  the sum of the parties’ payoffs is greater when judges are 
independent and unbiased.  We postulate this because both parties 
value predictable decisions that follow the legal text and unbiased de-
cisions promote such qualities. 
If the Table 8 parties play the game as a one-shot game, then the 
incumbent will choose managed judges regardless of whether that 
hurts his opponent more than it helps the incumbent.  In the one-
shot version, efficiency yields to self-interest.  If the parties repeat the 
game indefinitely, however, matters potentially change.  Suppose they 
hold an election every four years and with each election the opposi-
tion party obtains a chance to become the new incumbent and itself 
use the judiciary selfishly.  If the incumbent enjoys very high odds of 
winning the next election—more than a three-in-four chance, using 
our example’s numbers—nothing changes. 
 
60 RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 4, at 122.  For other recent examples of the 
theory, see generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003); F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically Op-
timal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 712 (2004); Lee Epstein, Jack 
Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Selecting Selection Systems, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE 
CROSSROADS:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 191 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry 
Friedman eds., 2002). 
61 See infra Part II.D. 
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Table 8:  The Alternating Parties Theory 
 
 
                                                         Opposition 
 
               Managed Judges                                  (10, 0) 
 
 
Incumbent     Independent and Unbiased Judges                     (8, 6) 
 
 
               Independent but Biased Judges                      (5, 5) 
 
Matters do change if the opposition obtains a serious chance of 
winning the next election.  Suppose the bias to the decisions by man-
aged judges do not deny the opposition that chance.  Two possible 
equilibria now emerge.  First, each party may choose to manage the 
judges when it is in power, knowing that the other party will not later 
reward any forbearance with its own forbearance.  This inefficient 
equilibrium will then become a self-fulfilling expectation.  If each 
party has a fifty percent chance of winning an election, this will yield 
an average payoff of five to each party (fifty percent times ten plus fifty 
percent times zero). 
Second, each party may choose independent and unbiased judges 
while in power, in the belief that if it leaves the courts alone the other 
party will as well.  This efficient equilibrium can also generate self-
fulfilling beliefs.  Each party’s average payoff will now be seven (fifty 
percent times eight plus fifty percent times six), which is higher than 
the average payoff of five in the inefficient equilibrium.62
Turn now to the possibility of independent but biased judges:  
judges who feel free to decide cases against the incumbent, but who 
do so according to their own political preferences rather than the law.  
They would produce politicized law rather than efficient law—
amounting to what (referring to the current U.S. Supreme Court) 
Richard Posner characterized as “essentially personal, subjective, and 
indeed arbitrary” opinions63—but not necessarily opinions politicized 
to help the incumbent.  Rather, the outcome will be random politici-
zation.  Whether the incumbent wins his election law case or not will 
62 If the payoffs are defined in terms of utility rather than money, as is standard in 
game theory, then Table 8 already incorporates risk aversion.  The reason a player pre-
fers the 8/6 payoff combination to the 10/0 is simply that an average payoff of 7 is bet-
ter than an average payoff of 5. 
63 Richard A. Posner, Foreword:  A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 56 (2005). 
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depend on sheer luck.  Because half of the decisions will favor each 
party and all outcomes will generate poor law, we assign expected 
payoffs of five to both the incumbent and the opposition.  If the two 
parties expect to alternate in incumbency and opposition, they are in-
different between managed judges and independent judges, because 
both yield expected payoffs of five.  They would prefer independent 
unbiased judges, for expected payoffs of seven each.  On the other 
hand, if a party expects to be in power enough of the time, it would 
prefer managed judges—with a payoff of ten whenever it is in power—
to independent biased judges.  Thus, a system of independent but bi-
ased judges is never optimal.  We nevertheless raise the possibility to 
emphasize that judicial independence does not remove politicization 
from the judiciary and, in fact, can make things worse. 
Consider now the United States and pre-1993 Japan.  Competition 
for control of the federal executive branch of the United States is vig-
orous and the Democratic and Republican parties alternate in power.  
Federal judges are independent, and—when politically biased—biased 
in both directions in ways that largely track the biases of the presi-
dents who appointed them.  In Japan through 1993, on the other 
hand, the LDP was secure in power.  As the incumbent party in Table 
8, it preferred a system of managed judges and that is the system that 
continued throughout its years in power. 
C.  Japan After 1993 
Why then did things not change in Japan after 1993?  Once the 
LDP lost its traditional high probability of victory in every election, 
does not our alternating parties theory suggest that it would choose a 
more independent court system?  Would the LDP not expect that it 
could best promote its future interests if it disabled the Supreme 
Court and Secretariat from interfering with the careers of lower-court 
judges?  After all, if the LDP continued to maintain political and 
“managed” courts, its rivals would likely intervene equally politically 
whenever they came to power.  Yet when the LDP returned to power, 
the age and background of the Supreme Court justices did not 
change.  Neither did the career patterns in the lower courts. 
The lack of change in the age and background of Supreme Court 
justices from 1993 to 1996 is easy to explain.  The multi-party coalition 
of 1993 had “other fish to fry,” and did not bother trying to renovate 
the court system it inherited.  The LDP-Socialist coalition that fol-
lowed was equally unstable and, locked in a coalition with the LDP, 
was not likely to change radically the system the LDP had designed.  
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Murayama did not break with the tradition of appointing an elderly 
lower-court judge to a particular Supreme Court “line,” though he did 
manage to find a YJL member who fit that description.  After 1996, 
however, the LDP appeared equally unwilling to abandon its system of 
“managed” lower-court judges and its tradition of appointing Su-
preme Court justices close to retirement. 
Perhaps the LDP—and the pro-LDP holdovers on the Supreme 
Court—wanted to change to the efficient equilibrium of independent 
and unbiased judges, but did not think they could change expecta-
tions.  Remember, even with alternating parties, the inefficient equi-
librium can continue as a set of self-fulfilling expectations; it is just 
that the alternation makes a more efficient equilibrium potentially 
self-fulfilling as well.  Perhaps in 1996 the LDP thought that its succes-
sor would “manage” the courts politically no matter what strategy it 
chose. 
Or maybe our Table 8 alternating parties theory does not really 
describe Japan.  In the theory, we assume that the combined payoffs 
of the opposition and the government are higher when judges are in-
dependent.  This assumption could be false for at least three reasons. 
First, the LDP did not need courts to be independent for people 
to trust it to honor the terms of its legislation.  Through its long track 
record, by 1993 it had already built a solid reputation for keeping its 
promises.  Landes and Posner suggested that politicians establish in-
dependent courts not because they fear what would happen in elec-
tions, but because no one would otherwise believe the promises they 
made their constituents.64  A government may establish a patent sys-
tem, but inventors will not respond unless they think it will honor the 
patent later.  By creating independent courts that force the govern-
ment to honor the patents, the government can make its promise to 
inventors credible.  The logic applies to all government promises, 
from the promise not to take property without compensation, to the 
promise to pay contractors for road projects. 
The LDP, however, had less need for this kind of commitment 
mechanism.  It had long been in power.  Unlike a new party, it had a 
good track record for reliability in honoring deals, even if not for ab-
stention from collecting the proceeds from such deals. 
Second, in the Japanese system of “managed judges,” the judiciary 
(even if not the judges) largely runs itself.  Although politicians 
choose Supreme Court justices in both the United States and Japan, 
64 Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 877-79. 
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in neither can they fire the justices.  In an extreme constitutional cri-
sis—say, an executive who wants, Hitler-like, to grant himself dictato-
rial powers—we could expect both Supreme Courts to behave simi-
larly (whether similarly well or similarly badly is hard to say).  The 
difference between the United States and Japanese judiciaries lies in 
the lower courts. 
In the “managed judges” system of Japan, the lower-court judges 
lack independence.  They are free of direct control by politicians, but 
the Supreme Court and Secretariat control their careers.  Although 
the Secretariat must pick the judges from the small but talented pool 
of people who have passed a difficult examination and chosen a judi-
cial career, it can punish and neutralize dissident judges without over-
ruling each of their decisions.  Japan can avoid the outcome of inde-
pendent but biased judges relatively easily:  the Secretariat selects 
judges for ability rather than interest in politics and suppresses any 
lower-court judge who does develop a taste for making public policy.  
At the same time, if the Secretariat—following the wishes of the voters 
and the LDP—wants the lower-court judges to make public policy in-
telligently, filling gaps left by statutes, it can reward judges for their 
policymaking ability.  It is just that those judges may be punished if 
they choose policies of which the Secretariat disapproves.  Obviously, 
this leaves little scope for the judge to indulge his personal political 
tastes. 
In the United States, however, the President and Senate pick 
lower-court judges, and once picked, those judges enjoy secure jobs.  
Although this enables the President to pick politically loyal judges, it 
reduces his (or the Supreme Court’s) ability to control them.65  Thus, 
the Supreme Court of Japan has more power over the lower courts 
than the Supreme Court of the United States, even though it rarely 
overturns statutes or enjoins the government.66
Happy with such a system, perhaps the LDP decided that its best 
strategy in the new competitive environment was to establish as an 
equilibrium a self-perpetuating and largely independent judiciary----
65 See Posner, supra note 63, at 62-63 (“[L]ife tenure on a fixed salary . . . , so that 
there are neither carrots nor sticks, . . . is a temptation to irresponsibility . . . .”). 
66 Recall that the United States Supreme Court only invalidated two federal stat-
utes in its first seventy years.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 
(1803) (invalidating the Judiciary Act of 1789); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393, 452 (1857) (holding that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional); 
see also William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 589 (2004) 
(discussing the Marbury and Dred Scott cases).  The Japanese Constitution of 1947 has 
only been with us for fifty-nine years. 
  
2006] THE CASE FOR MANAGED JUDGES 1925 
“largely” because it wanted judges who exercised conservative inclina-
tions.  Granted, if it shifted to appointing justices at age fifty it could 
reduce the ability of its successors to appoint new justices.  It would 
also, however, create a new tradition of radical change in the judiciary 
of which those successors might take full advantage.  And it would give 
the youthful justices more years to change their conservative inclina-
tions and decide that they liked making public policy.  Regardless of 
whether they became conservative activists or shifted to the left, the 
transformation would reduce the power of the executive and legisla-
tive branches.  Better, the LDP perhaps reasoned, to continue its tra-
dition of appointing justices close to retirement age. 
 Third, the system of “managed judges” works.  Independent 
but biased judges create a mishmash of law attractive to neither the 
incumbent nor the opposition.  They do so in everyday cases as well as 
electorally sensitive ones.  Independent and unbiased judges make 
more consistent law—but “managed judges” will be more consistent 
even than independent and unbiased judges, as we will explain in the 
next section. 
D.  The Benefits 
Managed judges yield dramatic benefits for Japanese citizens.  The 
judges may favor the politics of their manager.  But they also have a 
strong incentive to perform.  By placing them within a competitive in-
ternal labor market, the Japanese government has given them strong 
incentives along two crucial dimensions:  to work hard and to decide 
similar cases similarly. 
1.  Rhetoric 
If we miss the virtues of managed judges in the academy, we miss 
them because we assume that with judicial independence, more is bet-
ter than less.  A little common sense goes a long way here.  Judges are 
government employees.  They may have gold-plated educations.  They 
may be smart.  They may be sophisticated.  They may even be rich, in 
comparison to postal workers.  But, they are still government employ-
ees.  And like all government employees—like all human beings—they 
do more and better work if someone notices and rewards them for 
their efforts. 
Unfortunately, in the rhetoric with which we describe all matters 
legal, we lose that simple truth.  We speak of the legal “profession” 
rather than the legal services industry.  We speak of “access to justice” 
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rather than of helping people win their quarrels.  To referee these 
quarrels, we hire (and pay from the public fisc) a specialized corps of 
government workers called judges.  But at least in the federal courts, 
we neither supervise them nor give them incentives to work hard.  In-
stead, we glorify their essential irresponsibility.  As Henry Hart put it: 
[T]he Court is predestined in the long run not only by the thrilling tra-
dition of Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its position in 
the structure of American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged 
with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and 
developing impersonal and durable principles of constitutional 
law . . . .
67
As with academic freedom for professors, judicial independence is 
romantic and comfortable, but not a policy destined to encourage in-
tense effort or strict accountability.  Indeed, judges do not even have 
to worry about having their opinions rejected for publication.  We 
would not therefore expect federal judges to operate as efficiently as, 
for instance, civil-service administrators in the Department of Agricul-
ture.  They at least must compete for promotion, even if they need not 
fear unemployment. 
2.  Results 
In Japan, politicians do not insulate their judges.  Instead, judges 
who bring talent and energy to the job earn rewards.  The (relatively) 
dull and lazy fail to advance. 
The results are impressive.  Where the federal and state govern-
ments in the United States employ 27,000 judges and magistrates, the 
Japanese government uses barely 3000 regular and summary court 
judges.68  With half the American population, Japan makes do with 
one-ninth the number of judges. 
Even with this smaller number of judges, the Japanese judiciary 
processes cases with the alacrity of many of the U.S. federal courts.  
Overall, U.S. federal district courts decide about sixty-five percent of 
their cases within a year, and eighty-five percent within two years.  
Japanese courts decide fifty-five percent of cases within a year and sev-
67 Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword:  The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 
99 (1959).  Posner characterizes this sentence as “the famous purple passage” of Hart’s 
foreword.  Posner, supra note 63, at 72. 
68 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2005), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos272.htm. 
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enty-eight percent within two.69  This is slower than the federal courts 
on average,70 but still close—and far ahead of many U.S. state court 
systems.71
Although the competitive labor market within the Japanese judi-
ciary does induce judges to work hard and to work smart—the Secre-
tariat does look at case management as one skill it wants to see in a 
judge—the key to the spectacular performance of the national system 
probably does not lie in judicial effort.  We obviously speculate here, 
and turn to issues beyond the scope of our data.  But the key to the 
Japanese judiciary’s success probably lies instead in uniformity—
particularly in the uniformity of the judicial output.  When monitor-
ing and evaluating its employees (i.e., judges), the Secretariat exam-
ines how hard the employees work.  It apparently weighs docket-
clearance rates heavily (we have long wished we had the data for our 
regressions), and that fact obviously affects how rapidly judges process 
cases.  Yet the Secretariat also examines output quality.  Do judges fol-
low precedent?  Do they decide cases the same way other judges have 
decided similar cases in the past? 
By requiring judges to decide like cases alike, the Secretariat in-
creases the predictability of the adjudicative process.  In turn, that 
predictability promotes settlement.  Whether in the United States or 
in Japan, litigation is expensive.  As a result, worldwide, most dispu-
tants litigate a quarrel only if they cannot agree on the expected out-
come of the litigation.  More specifically, they litigate only if they each 
are optimistic about the outcome.72
Through its monitoring, the Secretariat reduces the variance in 
the adjudicative process.  And by doing so, it reduces the fraction of 
disputes in which the parties estimate their chances in litigation opti-
mistically.  In turn, by reducing that incidence of mutual optimism, it 
69 See J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW:  AN ECONOMIC AP-
PROACH 140-41 tbl.6.1 (1999) (presenting data for 1994). 
70 Id. 
71 See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT 
CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2004, at 137-46 tbls.7-8 (2004), available at http:// 
www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2004_Files/SCCSTabl5-8.pdf (reporting the 
caseloads of state trial courts broken down by type of action (Table 7) and jurisdiction 
(Table 8)). 
72 The point is well known.  See, e.g., William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the 
Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 99-101 (1971) (providing a litigation-settlement model); 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 (1973) (same). 
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increases the ability of the parties to settle their dispute and pocket 
the fees they would otherwise pay their lawyers.73
3.  Politics 
The “costs” of these managed judges are far lower than most 
commentators claim.  Although scholars typically focus on political 
cases as the most interesting, few real-world cases raise political issues.  
Notwithstanding our collective invocation of “justice,” “fairness,” and 
“equity,” the vast majority of court cases in any modern society are 
mundane in the extreme—typically, they are traffic accidents and 
debt collection disputes.  In consensual transactions such as debt con-
tracts, however, the expected litigated outcome of a dispute necessar-
ily generates offsetting ex ante adjustments to terms.  Inaccurate court 
assessments of expectation damages, for example, simply induce par-
ties to include liquidated damage terms.  As a result, even of these two 
categories of cases, only traffic accidents raise any serious issues of 
fairness. 
What is more, even in those rare, politically sensitive cases, a Japa-
nese-style monitoring system will usually just induce judges to deliver 
the policies and programs that the electorate wants.  In democratic 
countries like Japan and the United States, politicians win office only 
through highly competitive electoral markets.  Necessarily, those who 
do not deliver the portfolio of policies and programs demanded by a 
plurality of the electorate seldom stay in power.  When those plurality 
politicians force their political “bias” on judges, they largely—with ex-
ceptions to be sure—just force their judges to deliver the same.74
73 See J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant:  Settlement 
Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 290 (1989) (applying the liti-
gation-settlement model to Japanese traffic-accident disputes). 
74 Commentators sometimes raise the need to protect “powerless” minorities.  Yet 
if the majority party in the legislature will not protect them, we see little reason to 
think their appointees in court would do so either.  Commentators routinely invoke 
the civil rights cases won by the African American community.  Most of these cases, 
however, African Americans won only after they became a key component of the coali-
tion behind the Democratic Party.  African Americans did not obtain civil rights in 
court because they were politically powerless.  They only began winning civil rights 
cases after they ceased to be powerless.  See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 160-62 (1991) (commenting on the weak 
power of courts in civil-rights disputes); see also Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials 
Won’t:  Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions 1935-85, 97 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 483, 495 (2003) (arguing that the courts desegregated labor unions 
when elected officials failed to act).  Fryman’s article confirms, however, that court ac-
tion only began to be effective after the late 1960s, when African American political 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In countries like Japan and the United States, everybody seems to 
love judicial independence—as an abstract concept.  Even the U.S. 
Chief Justice and his colleagues laud its virtues.  Were he to examine 
the concept a little more closely, however, the Chief Justice’s enthusi-
asm might wane.  Does he really want lower-court judges who are in-
dependent enough to flout his wishes to no consequence except the 
occasional reversal—a reversal that leaves the judges no worse than if 
they had towed the line in the first place?  Might the Chief Justice not 
prefer the power to transfer a troublesome (in his view, incompetent) 
judge away from an important court to a divorce court in the hinter-
land? 
To calm the Chief Justice’s conscience, we would note that giving 
him the power to transfer a troublesome judge need not necessarily 
reduce the independence of the judiciary.  The power to transfer re-
duces the independence of individual lower-court judges, but it does 
so by transferring power from lower-court judges to the Chief Justice.  
On net, the transfer could even strengthen the judiciary as a whole, 
since unity strengthens an organization.  Not only would the judiciary 
speak with one voice, but lower-court judges would have stronger in-
centives to work harder, and the most important posts would go to the 
hardest-working and smartest judges.  Actually, the posts would go 
only to those judges willing to toe the Chief Justice’s line, but merit 
would nonetheless play a key role in selection. 
Japan has had such a judicial system, with much success.  Despite 
its constraints, the Japanese judiciary has attracted some of the best 
and brightest university graduates.  Indeed, perhaps it attracts those 
graduates precisely because of its constraints.  After all, the system 
clearly and predictably rewards meritorious judges willing to put aside 
their personal political preferences, and such rewards attract many 
bright young minds.  Nor need Japanese judges spend the first half of 
their lives cultivating connections with politicians so as to enhance 
their chances for appointment or election.  All they must do—but do 
throughout their career—is to work hard and pay attention to what 
the Secretariat wants of them.  The system may not attract people who 
want to change the world, but it does attract those who are willing and 
power had grown, and that attempts to give the EEOC more enforcement power were 
opposed not only by southern members of Congress, but by civil rights lawyers who 
preferred private enforcement. 
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able to implement the law uniformly across the country as the Su-
preme Court wishes. 
One reason this system has worked well in Japan was the comfort-
able but not dictatorial dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party 
before 1993.  With its long time horizon and ability to make law via 
legislative enactment rather than court rulings, the LDP was willing to 
control the courts with a light hand in most matters.  There were ex-
ceptions such as election law and injunctions, but so long as the courts 
stayed out of politics the LDP rarely made its impact felt in the courts. 
After 1993, Japanese politics became more like those of other de-
mocratic countries, with the incumbent party never very confident 
that it would win the next election.  In theory, the LDP’s more tenu-
ous hold on power might have led to Supreme Court justices being 
appointed younger and serving longer terms.  In theory, it might have 
led to lower-court judges being more willing to buck the current Se-
cretariat in the hopes that a future one might reward them.  In prac-
tice, we find no evidence of either phenomenon.  Rather, we see the 
courts at all levels continuing much as they did before.  Is this because 
the Liberal Democratic Party, which has continued to be in power for 
most of the years between 1993 and 2005 despite its shakier hold, likes 
the political viewpoint of the current judiciary and would not mind 
establishing a custom of leaving it as it has been in the past?  Or is it 
that the conventional wisdom of LDP insecurity after 1993 is not 
shared by the LDP leaders, and they see their hold on power as 
stronger than we do?  We will not pretend to know more about Japa-
nese politics than the leaders of the LDP, but we have made our guess 
about what they believe; look back in ten years, readers, and tell us if 
we were right. 
